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ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist organization, an 
ethno-nationalist separatist terrorist organization that has been operating in 
Turkey since 1978. Through the lens of the contemporary social movement 
theory, this thesis attempts to designate and disrupt the key components of the 
PKK terrorist organization. Ultimately, the study focuses on the “mobilizing 
structures” component among the three key variables of this theory in order to 
disrupt the structure of the PKK terrorist organization. First, the study analyzes in 
detail sources of terrorist financing, such as state sponsorship, illegal activities, 
legal activities, extortion and the international diaspora, in order to designate the 
fund-raising assets of the PKK. Next, utilizing geographical information systems 
(GIS), the study examines the role of geographical safe havens as a mobilization 
asset in the PKK’s armed campaign. The dependence of the PKK’s armed 
campaign on geographical safe havens is spatially and temporally analyzed 
using data on terrorist incidents in Turkey from 2008 to 2010. Finally, the study 
concludes with strategic-level policy recommendations that counter the financial 
and physical structure of the PKK, built in accord with the outcomes of these 
analyses. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH................................................. 1 
B. THE PURPOSE AND THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH .................. 2 
C. METHODOLOGY................................................................................. 4 
D. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................... 4 
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ...................................................................... 7 
A. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY........................... 7 
1. Introduction.............................................................................. 7 
2. Political Opportunities ............................................................ 8 
3. Mobilizing Structures ............................................................ 11 
a. Resource Mobilization Theory ................................... 11 
b. The Political Process Model....................................... 13 
c. Summary...................................................................... 15 
4. Frame-Alignment: Developing an Insurgent 
Consciousness ...................................................................... 16 
B. THEORETICAL ROADMAP FOR ANALYSIS................................... 22 
1. Framing the Concepts and Addressing the Problem ......... 22 
2. Research Questions Revisited ............................................. 23 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PKK TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.................... 25 
A. INTRODUCTION................................................................................ 25 
B. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND ...................................... 25 
C. UNDERSTANDING THE PKK: GOVERNING DYNAMICS ............... 29 
D. UNDERSTANDING THE PKK: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.. 32 
E. THREE DECADES OF PKK TERROR .............................................. 36 
IV. BLOODY MONEY: PKK FUNDING.............................................................. 43 
A. SOURCES OF FUNDING .................................................................. 43 
1. State Sponsorship ................................................................. 45 
a. Advantages and Disadvantages of State 
Sponsorship ................................................................ 45 
b. PKK and State Sponsorship ...................................... 46 
2. Illegal Activities...................................................................... 54 
a. Advantages and Disadvantages of Illegal 
Activities ...................................................................... 54 
b. PKK and Illegal Activities ........................................... 56 
3. Legal Activities ...................................................................... 62 
a. Advantages and Disadvantages of Legal Activities. 62 
b. PKK and Legal Activities............................................ 63 
4. Donations, Charity Organizations and International 
Diasporas ............................................................................... 66 
 viii
a. Advantages and Disadvantages of Donations, 
Charity Organizations and International Diasporas. 66 
b. PKK and International Diaspora ................................ 67 
5. Extortion................................................................................. 68 
a. Advantages and Disadvantages of Extortion ........... 68 
b. PKK and Extortion ...................................................... 69 
6. How Much Does the PKK Make? .......................................... 70 
B. ASSISTING FACTORS...................................................................... 74 
1. Safe Havens ........................................................................... 74 
2. The Relationship Between the Terrorist Organizations 
and Organized Crime............................................................. 78 
V. SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN 
TURKEY: 2008–2010 ................................................................................... 83 
A. A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF EXISTING 
TECHNIQUES.................................................................................... 84 
B. METHODOLOGY............................................................................... 86 
C. DATA AND EXPLANATORY VALUE OF ANALYSES ..................... 88 
1. Dataset Preparation............................................................... 88 
2. Proximity to Safe Havens...................................................... 89 
3. Temporal Pattern Analyses................................................... 90 
D. RESULTS........................................................................................... 91 
1. Spatial Clustering Analyses.................................................. 91 
a. Spatial Clustering Analyses for 2008 ........................ 92 
b. Spatial Clustering Analyses for 2009 ........................ 94 
c. Spatial Clustering Analyses for 2010 ........................ 95 
2. Temporal Analyses................................................................ 96 
E. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS ..................................................... 99 
F. CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 101 
VI. CONCLUSION............................................................................................ 103 
A. DESIGNATING THE PROBLEM AREAS ........................................ 103 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................... 104 
1. Mobilize Multinational Organizations and Promote 
Regional Partnerships......................................................... 104 
2. Establish and Promote Intelligence Sharing Efforts ........ 105 
3. Enhance the Capabilities of the Partner States ................ 107 
4. Identify an Interlocutor to the Kurdish Issue..................... 107 
5. Increase the Credibility and the Legitimacy of the 
Government.......................................................................... 109 
C. MERGING THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION......................... 112 
LIST OF REFERENCES........................................................................................ 115 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................... 121 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Organizational Structure of the PKK Before 2005 .................................. 33 
Figure 2. Organizational Structure of the PKK After 2005 ..................................... 34 
Figure 3. The PKK’s Flags..................................................................................... 37 
Figure 4. Balkan Route (After UNODC, World Drug Report 2009, 180.) ............... 58 
Figure 5. Tentative Projection of Shifts in PKK’s Financing Sources..................... 71 
Figure 6. Estimated Income of the PKK Terrorist Organization ............................. 73 
Figure 7. Possible Relationships and Transformations Between Terrorist 
Organizations and Criminal Enterprises (From Williams, “Terrorist 
Financing and Organized Crime,” 134)................................................... 79 
Figure 8. Hot Spots Identified by Getis-Ord Gi Analyses ....................................... 93 
Figure 9. Security Forces Efforts Compared to Terrorist Incidents Intensity.......... 97 
Figure 10. Temporal Intensity of Terrorist Incidents and  Counterterrorism Efforts . 98 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Theoretical Framework of the Social Movement Theory ........................ 24 
Table 2. z Score Values for Clustering Analyses.................................................. 92 
Table 3. Problem Areas and Their Domains....................................................... 103 
Table 4. Policy Recommendations and Problem Areas Addressed ................... 112 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
DHKP/C Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front 
GIS Geographical Information Systems 
GOI Government of Iraq 
KADEK Kurdistan Democratic and Freedom Congress 
KDP Kurdistan Democrat Party 
KONGRA-GEL Kurdistan People’s Congress 
KRG Kurdish Regional Government 
PJAK Kurdistan Free Life Party 
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
SMO Social Movement Organization 
THB Trafficking Human Beings 
UKO National Liberation Army 
UN United Nations 
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank Professor Sean Everton and Professor Douglas Borer 
for their supportive approach, for without them I would not have been able to 
complete this thesis. They have encouraged my ideas on how to shape the 
analyses that constitute the backbone of this study. 
My wife, I would like to thank you, for you had to listen to much more than 
what is written here. Your help in shaping the ideas in my mind, and your 
continuous support through all aspects of this hard journey, is invaluable. 
Brave soldiers of the Turkish Army, I always thought of the martyrs, the 
veterans and all the members of the Armed Forces who have fought and who 
continue to fight this undeclared war against the PKK terror on Turkish soil as I 
wrote this thesis. I hope that this thesis plays a part in ending the PKK terror, no 
matter how insignificant that role may be. 
 
 xvi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Kerkaren Kurdistan: PKK) terrorist 
organization officially began its armed campaign against the Turkish government 
in 1984. Since that time, it has claimed the lives of more than 30,000 people, a 
number that continues to grow. In addition to lives lost, conservative estimates 
calculate that the PKK terror has maimed, injured, or resulted in the conviction of 
200,000 people over the course of more than 30 years of terrorist activity. 
During this timeframe, Turkey has spent billions of dollars to increase the 
capabilities of its military assets, in an effort to counter the PKK and to provide 
security for its citizens—money that could have been spent for the welfare of the 
Turkish people in the construction of much-needed hospitals, schools, roads, and 
factories, rather than to buy bombs that fall on Turkey’s own soil. 
Besides loss of life and its economic impact, the PKK terror campaign has 
also created complications for Turkey in the international arena. The PKK 
successfully sided with many countries that have disputes with Turkey. Some 
countries do not refrain from using the PKK as an extension of their policy 
options against Turkey. Consequently, the PKK has enjoyed a significant amount 
of external support from these countries, ranging from safe heavens to 
professional military training.  
There are innumerable factors that explain the prolonged existence of the 
PKK, from external support to funds generated through lucrative illegal activities. 
This continued presence is cause for concern, given the fact that Turkey has run 
a decisive counterterrorist campaign for 30 years in order to address the effects 
of these conditions. Turkey’s strategies have included a prolonged and 
successful military campaign, economic measures to increase the overall welfare 
and quality of life of population sectors most susceptible to the influence of the 
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PKK, and political efforts and initiatives aimed at resolving social problems. 
Turkey also captured and imprisoned Abdullah Ocalan, the founder and cultic 
leader of the PKK, in 1999. Surprisingly, even with its key leader in prison, state 
sponsorship at an all-time low, and security problems significantly addressed, the 
PKK continues to thrive. 
The PKK has not often been the subject of scholarly studies, even though 
it is one of the largest and most important terrorist organizations in the world. 
This research aims to identify strategies for disrupting the PKK’s organizational 
structure with the aim of contributing to the growing body of literature on 
counterterrorism efforts. Since identifying the fundamental concepts that drive 
terrorist networks helps to increase their visibility, one of the main questions 
guiding this research is: “What are the omnipresent features of the PKK terrorist 
organization?” The answer to this question is expected to identify the 
fundamental and noninterchangeable features of the PKK. This answer in turn 
generates another important question: “Is it possible to disrupt the PKK by 
exploiting these key components?” In addition to describing the fundamental 
features of the PKK terrorist organization, this research seeks tangible ways of 
disrupting these components. 
B. THE PURPOSE AND THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
The main purpose of this research is to identify the governing dynamics of 
the PKK terrorist organization and to craft strategic-level tangible policy options 
and recommendations that could be employed against these fundamental 
features, which would in turn cause friction within the PKK, disruption of its 
activities, and, ultimately, its collapse. In an effort to discover the key 
components of the PKK, the study examines the PKK through the lens of the 
social movement theory. After identifying the fundamental features of the PKK, 
the study conducts an in-depth analysis of these features in order to find 
applicable measures for disrupting the PKK terrorist organization. 
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Central to any counterterrorism effort is its capability to engage the full 
spectrum of an organizational structure and to thus render the terrorist group 
unable or unwilling to continue to function. Nonetheless, this study is not 
intended either to establish a new, all-encompassing counterterrorism strategy, 
or to evaluate the overall effectiveness of Turkey’s existing counterterrorism 
campaign. Neither is it concerned with past counterterrorism strategies and their 
ensuing effects.  Obviously, the results of political decisions and counterterrorism 
measures carried out to date have had a significant role in shaping the current 
state of the PKK’s campaign and its effects on Turkey. The scope of this 
research is limited to framing the PKK terrorist organization through the lens of 
social movement theory and conducting an analysis of the key components of its 
structure in order to find and exploit weak spots. 
Existing literature about the PKK terrorist organization is largely 
subjective, due to the aforementioned fact that the PKK is one of the least-
frequently studied terrorist organizations. This phenomenon is further 
underscored by the fact that the PKK’s campaign is ongoing and thus, the 
literature is still open to manipulation for the purposes of propaganda and 
agitation. However, this study aims to evaluate the literature objectively and to 
prevent rhetoric from overshadowing or directing the analysis and conclusions of 
this research. 
Counterterrorism is a war fought on many fronts. In order to win such a 
war, incumbent authority needs to win several battles on different fronts. This 
study examines some of the existing fronts against the PKK from a different 
viewpoint. Its main idea is that looking at the problems from different 
perspectives can provide a better understanding of the problem and accordingly 
help create better solutions. The study intends to find applicable counterterrorism 
measures to create friction within the PKK, to disrupt the PKK’s activities, and 




The first phase of this research draws on the social movement theory in 
order to explore the key components of the PKK’s organizational structure. The 
second phase examines these components in greater depth using both 
qualitative analysis (e.g., case studies) and quantitative analysis (e.g., 
geographical information systems analysis). These in turn help identify measures 
that can undermine the PKK’s organizational structure. The final phase consists 
of identifying appropriate policy recommendations based on the previous 
analysis. 
One of the main concerns of security studies is finding precise and 
complete data for analysis. This study uses government reports, news articles, 
books, studies made by security experts, and other related open source data to 
analyze the financial and organizational structure of the PKK terrorist 
organization. 
D. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Chapter I presents an overview of the persistent terrorism campaign of the 
PKK in Turkey, and sets forth the research questions that address the literature 
gap that the study intends to fill. It also defines the purpose of the study and 
draws the boundaries of the study, designating its limitations. Furthermore, it 
discusses the methodology of the study and includes the organization of the 
thesis. 
Chapter II examines the conceptual framework of the study. Drawing on 
Resource Mobilization Theory,1 the Political Process Model,2 and Frame-
                                            
1 McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A 
Partial Theory.” The American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (May, 1977): 1212–1241, 
www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/2777934 (accessed October 5, 2010).  
2 McAdam, Doug, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 
2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, 41–58. 
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Alignment Process Theory,3 contemporary social movement theory is outlined 
and elaborated.  The chapter concludes with the definition of the theoretical 
picture and the conceptual roadmap of the thesis. 
Chapter III examines the PKK terrorist organization in its historical and 
social context. It also highlights the prominent characteristics of the PKK, putting 
the organizational structure in the spotlight as well as examining its physical 
structure. The chapter concludes with a chronology of important events in the 
PKK’s terror campaign of the last 30-plus years. 
Chapter IV discusses the financial aspects of the PKK terrorist 
organization. This chapter is organized as a case study to examine the major 
sources that the PKK uses to generate its funds. This chapter also provides 
insight into the fundamental concepts of terrorist financing. 
Chapter V presents a quantitative analysis of the physical infrastructure of 
the PKK terrorist organization. Examining terror incidents between 2008 and 
2010, it uses geographical information systems (GIS) analysis to identify the 
PKK’s physical infrastructure. This chapter focuses on spatial clustering and 
temporal analyses of terrorist incidents in order to examine the characteristics of 
the PKK’s armed activities within Turkey. 
Chapter VI summarizes the results of the analysis and provides policy 
recommendations for targeting the key components of the PKK’s organizational 
structure. The thesis attempts to offer tangible strategic-level countermeasures 
that would disrupt the PKK terrorist organization. The author of this thesis 
believes that the outcomes of analyses presented in this study also provide 
insight into Turkey’s past and present counterterrorism measures, and hopes that 
this study will provide further understanding of the underlying principles of past 
efforts, enhancing present and future measures, even if only in a small way. 
                                            
3 Snow, David A., Burke E. Jr., Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. “Frame 
Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological 
Review 51, no. 4 (August, 1986): 464-481, http://prelim2009.filmbulletin.org/readings/08-
Social_Change/Snow.pdf (accessed October 9, 2010). 
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II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Drawing on McCarthy and Zald’s4 resource mobilization theory, McAdam’s 
political process model,5 and Snow’s6 frame-alignment process theory, this 
chapter outlines contemporary social movement theory, which serves as this 
thesis’s conceptual framework, beginning with a brief overview before exploring 
the theory in depth. The chapter also includes the interpretation of these models 
as they are used in this research. 
A. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY7 
1. Introduction 
People often assume that social movements and insurgencies emerge 
when individuals become angry enough about a given societal condition that they 
organize in order to bring about change. While there is an element of truth in this 
sentiment, in most societies, there are plenty of individuals dissatisfied with the 
status quo, but few become activists or form a social movement.8  Instead, other 
factors need to fall into place before a social movement can emerge. In 
particular, social movement theorists argue that in order for a movement to 
successfully mobilize, not only do people need to harbor grievances of some 
kind, but (1) they also need to recognize that they share their grievances with 
others and that together they can do something about them (i.e., framing, 
development of an insurgent consciousness); (2) they need to have access to 
                                            
4 McCarthy and Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements.” 
5 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 36–59. 
6 Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.” 
7 Much of the following discussion is based on Sean Everton, “Social Movement Theory,” 
Working Paper, Graduate School of Operational & Information Sciences, Defense Analysis 
Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2010, n.p. and Douglas A. Borer, Sean F. 
Everton, and Moises M. Nayve, Jr., 2009, “Global Development and Human (In)security: 
Understanding the Rise of the Rajah Solaiman Movement and Balik Islam in the Philippines,” 
Third World Quarterly 30:181–204. 
8 McCarthy and Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements.” 
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sufficient internal resources (e.g., adequate financing, formal organizations, 
informal network of potential members and organizations, leaders, meeting 
places, safe spaces, etc.) in order to mobilize on their own without having to rely 
on external funding (i.e., sufficient mobilizing resources); and (3) the broader 
political environment needs to become conducive to insurgency formation (i.e., 
expanding political opportunities).9 Individually, none of these factors is sufficient 
to generate and sustain an insurgency, but when they converge, the probability 
that a social movement will emergence increases.10 Specifically, when 
expanding political opportunities interact with strong indigenous organizations, 
they provide potential insurgents with the “structural potential” for collective 
action, which in turn can facilitate the development of an insurgent 
consciousness that can transform the movement’s “structural potential” into an 
actual insurgency.11 The following discussion examines these factors in more 
depth. 
2. Political Opportunities 
Societies consist of many different groups. Minorities within a given 
society usually face many obstacles when it comes to changing the political 
status quo in their favor. According to McAdam, various events and processes 
such as “wars, industrialization, international political realignments, prolonged 
unemployment, and widespread demographic changes” can cause a shift in 
political opportunities.12  These opportunities are both rare and can change 




                                            
9 Everton, “Social Movement Theory,” n.p. 
10 Everton, “Social Movement Theory,” n.p. 
11 Smith, Christian S., The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social 
Movement Theory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 64–65. 
12 McAdam, Doug, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 41. 
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can materialize: (1) the openness of the political system, (2) political instability, 
(3) the presence of elite allies, and (4) the state’s ability and inclination for 
repression.13 
The first dimension constitutes the “formal legal and institutional structure 
of a given polity”14 and refers to the reaction of the incumbent political system to 
the social movement. Broad social changes may serve to increase society’s 
overall tolerance level to unorthodox ideas favorable to aggrieved populations.15 
The emergence and life cycle of social movements are significantly related to the 
political structure of the incumbent authority. While some formal political 
structures like democracy provide more opportunities for the emergence and 
sustainment of social movements, other political structures may make it harder 
for political opportunities to expand. 
The second dimension, political instability, is concerned with the level of 
control exercised by the existing power structure. When the incumbent authority 
runs the formal legal structure effectively, the overall system is considered stable, 
but events that affect the incumbent authority’s level of control can lead to 
political instability. Such events include armed conflict, economic crises, and 
natural catastrophes such as earthquakes, floods, and epidemic diseases. Social 
movements can capitalize on these when they expand their political 
opportunities.16 On the other hand, the accumulation of the effects of broad 
social processes, such as industrialization, can expand political opportunities 
over the long term in a less dramatic way than sudden incidents can.17 
                                            
13 McAdam, Doug, “Conceptual Origins, Problems, Future Directions.” Chap. 1, in 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, 
and Cultural Framings, 23–41, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 27. 
14 McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Problems, Future Directions,” 27. 
15 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 42. 
16 Smith, Christian S., The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion and Social 
Movement Theory, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 59. 
17 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 41. 
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Third, the amount of political power available to an aggrieved population is 
directly related to the number of power sources within the formal structure that 
support a social movement advocating for that population. The presence of elite 
allies strengthens the power base of these movements. With a strong political 
power base in the legal system, realizing social change becomes easier for 
social movements. However, when the expansion of political opportunities occurs 
in this manner it tends to be a more gradual process because it depends on the 
formal system’s adoption to some extent of the goals of the social movement.18 
Fourth, a state’s ability and inclination to repress insurgent groups 
presents a limiting factor for expanding political opportunities. McAdam points to 
the 1989 Chinese student movement and the 1979 Iranian revolution in order to 
highlight this dimension.19 According to McAdam, the Chinese student movement 
was in relatively good shape in terms of the other dimensions of political 
opportunities until Communist party hard-liners utilized the social control assets 
of the system to repress the movement.20  In contrast, one of the reasons why 
the Iranian revolution succeeded was because the incumbent political system 
lacked the ability to repress the movement.21 Thus, these cases illustrate how 
the state’s ability and inclination to repress insurgent groups affects the extent to 
which political opportunities will expand in terms of particular social movements. 
These four dimensions illustrate how expanding political opportunities can 
help social movements achieve their goals. Successful social movements 
capitalize on these factors in order to bring about the social change they desire. 
                                            
18 Smith, “The Emergence of Liberation Theology”, 59. 
19 McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Problems, Future Directions,” 28. 
20 McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Problems, Future Directions,” 28. 
21 McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Problems, Future Directions,” 28. 
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3. Mobilizing Structures 
Favorable changes in the political environment only increase the 
probability that insurgent movements will successfully mobilize. Whether they 
actually do so or not also depends on whether they have sufficient access to the 
resources they need in order to mobilize and sustain their cause.22 While 
expanding political opportunities helps create an environment in which social 
movements can mobilize, their organizational capacity as well as their ability to 
access, attract, and generate resources helps to define the breadth of the 
movements. The main focus of mobilizing structures is “the organizations and 
informal networks that comprise the collective building blocks of social 
movements and revolutions,”23 a subject to which this thesis now turns, 
beginning with McCarthy and Zald’s resource mobilization theory and then 
examining the insights of McAdam’s political process model. 
a. Resource Mobilization Theory 
In developing their resource mobilization theory,24 McCarthy and 
Zald sought “to break with grievance-based conceptions of social movements 
and to focus instead on mobilization process and the formal organizational 
manifestations of these processes.”25 Their theory is built on the assumption that 
in any given society there are enough grievances to support grassroots 
movements if the movements are well organized and have access to some 
degree of political power and material support.26 Furthermore, the theory argues 
that “grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by 
                                            
22 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency; McAdam et al., 
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements; McCarthy and Zald, “Resource Mobilization and 
Social Movements;” McAdam, Doug and David A. Snow, 2010, Readings on social movements: 
origins, dynamics and outcomes, New York: Oxford University Press. 
23 McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 3. 
24 McCarthy and Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements.” 
25 McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 3. 
26 As cited in McCarthy and Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements,” 1215. 
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issue entrepreneurs and [social movement] organizations.”27 Briefly, the resource 
mobilization model puts the emphasis on the mobilization process as a means of 
explaining the emergence of social movements. 
Resource mobilization theory highlights the types of resources to 
be mobilized, inter-movement relationships, external support, and the 
interactions between social movements and those in authority in order to explain 
social movement dynamics. In so doing, it adopts more of a sociological and 
economic approach to explaining collective behavior than a social psychological 
approach.28 The theory’s emphasis on a movement’s strategy and tactics, 
support base, and its relation to the larger society helped differentiate it from 
more classical approaches current at the time of its development.   
According to traditional approaches, “social movements are based 
upon aggrieved populations which provide the necessary resources.”29 Resource 
mobilization theory, however, claims that social movements may not necessarily 
be based upon the resources of aggrieved populations. Instead, other groups 
who do not directly benefit from the success of the movement can provide major 
sources of support.30 
Both traditional and resource mobilization perspectives agree that 
the strategy and tactics employed by social movements to interact with 
authorities depend heavily on the historical context, ideology, and the 
effectiveness of past applications between these two entities.31 Resource 
mobilization theory, however, emphasizes other strategies, such as mobilizing 
supporters and generating funds, which are also utilized by social movement 
organizations (SMOs).32 Thus, while traditional approaches note the ways in 
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which SMOs implement tactics and strategies to interact with those in authority, 
resource mobilization theory adds the strategic tasks of resource generating and 
manipulating the dynamics of inter-organizational relations into this set of 
functions. 
McCarthy and Zald also argue that traditional models neglect the 
ways in which SMOs can utilize the social environment.33 They focus more on 
the level of grievances or the level of tolerance to the status quo in the larger 
society and treat the larger society and culture as background noise.34 In 
contrast, resource mobilization theory argues that the larger society provides the 
infrastructure that SMOs utilize.35 “The aspects utilized include communication 
media and expense, levels of affluence, degree of access to institutional centers, 
preexisting networks, and occupational structure and growth.”36 
Resource mobilization theory argues that the central task of SMOs 
is accomplishing sets of target goals defined in accordance with particular social 
movements.37  SMOs need to possess adequate resources to realize their goals. 
Consequently, resource mobilization theory defines two basic limiting factors for 
SMOs: (1) “…resources must be controlled or mobilized before action is 
possible”; (2) “…the amount of activity directed toward goal accomplishment is 
crudely a function of the resources controlled by an organization.”38 
b. The Political Process Model 
The political process model incorporates many of the insights of 
resource mobilization theory but argues that informal (also called grassroots and 
indigenous) organizations are just as (or possibly more) important for the 
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emergence of social movements. According to the political process model, they 
are the most important assets of social movements when it comes to generating 
resources. Informal organizations provide five crucial resources to movements: 
members, leaders, established incentives, communication networks, and 
enterprise tools.39 This thesis examines each of these factors in turn.  
While families and friendship networks sit on the least formally-
organized end of the structure spectrum, SMOs, with their formal and complex 
organizational structures, land at the high end of this spectrum.40  Social 
movements mobilize members utilizing the full spectrum of these structures. 
Informal organizations often provide movements with members through kinship 
and friendship ties alone, while SMOs use the full range of structure and 
resources to provide members. 
Leaders are crucial for movements because the quality of 
leadership significantly affects the progress and success of movements. Social 
movement leaders usually emerge from the aggrieved population because of 
their abilities to unite, direct, motivate, and set an example for the movement. 
Eventually, these leaders promote the capabilities of the movements in order to 
acquire more resources, whether manpower or financial assets. 
McAdam defines incentives as “interpersonal rewards that provide 
the motive force for participation in these groups.”41 As mentioned above, 
whether it is a formal and complex SMO or an informal organization such as a 
family or kinship network, all movements take place within an established 
organization of some kind. Thus, if social movements can tie incentives to 
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organizational membership, they overcome the “free rider problem”42 and provide 
higher degrees of participation to the movement.43 
Communication networks that disseminate movement ideas are 
crucial to all social movements. An effective communication network among the 
members of an organization enhances the movement’s ability to mobilize 
resources. When social movements utilize existing organizations to generate 
resources, an existing communication network may also be utilized to 
disseminate the movement across the organization.44 
Enterprise tools are crucial in acquiring the most needed resources 
for social movements. Pre-existing organizational structures, either owned by the 
state or other organizations, are the main channels for new movements to 
acquire resources such as materials and funds. Movements may also approach 
other communities or their own sympathizers to obtain these resources.  
c. Summary 
Before moving on to the discussion of the final factor, one last point 
remains to be discussed about mobilizing structures. While both the political 
process model and resource mobilization theory underline the importance of 
available resources to social movements as a means of explaining the 
emergence and growth of these movements, the political process model also 
argues that social movements emerge either through informal institutional 
associational networks (i.e., friendship networks or kinship networks) or within 
established institutions. In contrast, resource mobilization theory points to SMOs 
as the sole explanatory variable of social movements. 
Movements change their character throughout their lifetime. When 
analyzed at different times, the relative importance of informal and formal 
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organizations for the same movement may fluctuate. Moreover, the type and 
scope of movements significantly affect the importance of required resources. 
Consequently, as the character of a movement changes over time, so does the 
importance of resources available to it. In some phases the movement can 
survive on few resources, while in other phases resources play a leading role for 
the movement’s survival. Thus, the explanatory values of these theories vary in 
different phases of a movement. Keeping this argument in mind, the study moves 
on to discuss the final factor of social movement theory. 
4. Frame-Alignment: Developing an Insurgent Consciousness 
In order for a social movement to rise and emerge, a group of people must 
both feel discontent about some aspect of their lives and believe that together 
they can take action to address this problem. When either of these perceptions is 
absent, it is unlikely that they will mobilize even if the structural potential for them 
to do so exists. Highlighting the dynamic and interactive relationship between 
political opportunities and mobilizing structures, the development of an insurgent 
consciousness is a uniting factor between these two elements in the emergence 
phase of social movements. Simply put, regardless of the scope of the change in 
the political arena, this change “becomes an ‘opportunity’ when it is framed as 
such by a group of actors sufficiently well organized to act on this shared framing 
of the situation.”45 Thus, frame alignment processes have a significant role in 
explaining movement participation.46 
Frame alignment theory builds upon the shortcomings and blind spots of 
the resource mobilization, psychofunctional and rational choice explanations of 
movement participation in social movements.47 One shortcoming is grievance 
interpretation. Resource mobilization and psychofunctional perspectives neglect 
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the fact that grievances are subjective in interpretation and such interpretations 
can change over time.48 A second shortcoming is their explanations of the 
decision to participate to a movement. Psychofunctional and rational choice 
perspectives see movement participation as a one-time decision for individuals. 
Frame alignment theory, however, argues that the continuance of participation is 
an ongoing process where individuals constantly reassess and renegotiate their 
participation in a movement.49 A final shortcoming is the tendency to over-
generalize participation processes. Different types of movement participation 
processes have been identified for social movements, such as block recruitment, 
network recruitment, sentiment pools, and conversion.50 The literature tends to 
bind the movement participation process to these theories, “regardless of 
variation in objectives, organizational structure, and opposition” to the social 
movement.51 Frame alignment theory also highlights the dynamic nature of the 
participation process, and argues that it is not possible to explain participation 
with a single static model throughout the lifetime of a movement. It Identifies four 
types of alignment processes explain the connection of the interpretive frames of 
participants and social movements. 
(1) The frame bridging process unifies two separate entities with the same 
ideology that are unaware of each other’s presence.52 Individuals, groups, and 
SMOs that possess the same ideology cannot collectively act unless they are 
aware of each other. Frame bridging refers to the organizational breadth of an 
SMO. Individual and group level networks and other information channels, such 
as e-mail, mass media and Web 2.0 assets, can be utilized to disseminate 
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information to the targeted population. In sum, the frame bridging process unites 
the organizations and groups that have the same frameworks but are unaware of 
each other by utilizing information diffusion techniques, which ultimately enables 
collective action. 
(2) Frame amplification refers “to the clarification and invigoration of an 
interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem or set of events.”53 
Events and their interpretation by individuals life are often blurred by the opinions 
of others, prior life experiences, and information from various sources. Frame 
amplification highlights the importance of the interpretive frame to provide 
support and participation in collective action. There are two types of frame 
amplification: value and belief amplification. 
(a) Value amplification refers to the process that clarifies, emphasizes and 
elevates the values that a particular movement is concerned with in order to 
mobilize the related population.54 For instance, different social movements 
highlighted values “associated with family, ethnicity, property and neighborhood 
integrity” during in the United States in 1985.55  
(b) Belief amplification, on the other hand, refers to the clarification and 
invigoration of the relationships between two things.56 It utilizes three different 
kinds of beliefs relevant to mobilization and participation: (i) Stereotypic beliefs 
about antagonistic or targets of influence; (ii) Beliefs about the probability of 
change or the efficacy of collective action; (iii) Beliefs about the necessity and 
propriety of standing up.57 Social movements point out and energize the 
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importance of these beliefs in an individual’s life so as to resonate their cause 
with that of the target audience. The ultimate outcome of this effort is to mobilize 
people for collective action. 
(3) Frame extension is concerned with the spectrum of values and beliefs 
that SMOs promote. Sometimes the main values and beliefs that SMOs promote 
may not completely resonate with the interests of the target audience. At this 
point, SMOs may need to enlarge their frame in a way that includes a larger 
audience and promotes more participation.58 Frame extension is a common 
strategy used by SMOs to increase participation for their cause. For instance, a 
SMO whose main objective is to reduce the defense budget may sponsor famous 
rock bands to rally otherwise uninterested individuals. In sum, frame extension is 
the growth of an SMO’s primary framework in order to encompass larger 
populations. 
(4) Frame transformation differs from other processes of frame alignment 
process in that it seeks to get participants to adopt an altogether new perspective 
for existing phenomena. Snow describes frame transformation process as follows 
The programs, causes, and values that some SMOs promote…may 
not resonate with…conventional lifestyles…and extant interpretive 
terms. When such is the case, new values may have to be planted 
and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and 
erroneous beliefs or “misframings” reframed in order to garner 
support and secure participants. What may be required, in short, is 
a transformation of frame.59 
Two beliefs underlie the basic concept of frame transformation, “the 
seriousness of the problem, issue or grievance in question; [and] beliefs about 
the locus of causality or blame.”60 Frame transformation is the redefinition of 
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these two beliefs in accordance with the beliefs of the movement. The scope of 
these beliefs designates the domain in which transformation is necessary in 
order to ensure participation. 
If the frame alignment process reshapes only a particular domain of life, 
“such as dietary habits, consumption patterns, leisure activities, social statuses, 
and self perception”61 it is referred as the transformation of domain-specific 
interpretive frames. This kind of transformation targets the change of a single 
interpretive perspective, rather than the whole value and belief system of the 
susceptible population. For instance, SMOs against drunk driving managed to 
transform the beliefs of participants that drunk driving is an inexcusable, immoral 
and unjust social practice.62 In this instance, only one belief (e.g., an accident 
caused by drunk driving is not unfortunate, it is a serious incident caused by the 
misbehavior of the drunk driver) is targeted within the interpretive perspectives of 
the participants. 
Transformations of global interpretive frames, however, targets change in 
all other domains in order to become the framework through which the subjects 
see the world.63 All other values and beliefs are reframed in accordance with this 
new frame. For instance, converts to Nichiren Shoshu, an orthodox Buddhist 
sect, state they have reached a clearer understanding of themselves and their 
surroundings after adopting the perspective of their sacred text.64 Put simply, 
their interpretive perspectives have been transformed, and they see the world 
through the framework of their new teachings. A final remark about frame 
transformation is that, whether it addresses a specific domain or the major 
framework, frame transformation or conversion is the only way to mobilize the 
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population to join a social movement when there is little or no overlap between 
the perspective of the target audience and that of the social movement.65 
The frame alignment processes discussed above help social movements 
mobilize their target audience. Without a proper relationship between the beliefs 
and values of the population and the social movements, or an awareness of each 
other’s presence, social movements are unable to mobilize the population and 
collective action will not be possible. Frame bridging, frame amplification, frame 
extension and frame transformation serve as ways to close the interpretive gap 
between the target population and a movement’s emergence. 
After the movement is underway, the framing of the underlying issues is 
no less important to the movement than they were in early stages.66 Social 
movements put significant effort into disseminating their message to larger 
populations.67 Furthermore, rather than the spontaneous and need-driven nature 
of the framing processes in the emergence phase, later framing processes are 
“heavily constrained by the ideas, collective identities, and worldviews adopted 
previously.”68 Finally, as a movement progresses and accumulates notable 
power, other actors (i.e., authorities and counter movements) intervene in the 
framing process, and it becomes a scene in which social movements and other 
actors conflict.69 
In sum, the frame-alignment process provides a bridge to unite political 
opportunities and mobilizing structures in the emergence phase of movements. 
In later phases, as a movement gains momentum, the framing process 
characterizes and distinguishes the movement and becomes the main plane on 
which a movement interacts with other actors. 
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B. THEORETICAL ROADMAP FOR ANALYSIS 
1. Framing the Concepts and Addressing the Problem 
The accumulated literature on social movement theory is vast. As far as 
the subject matter is concerned, the actors that seek social change are defined 
as minorities and aggrieved groups within a society. More often than not, 
violence, ranging from civil disobedience to outright terrorist acts, is defined as a 
strategy or tactic for social movements as a way of achieving their goals. 
Increasingly, social scientists use social movement theory, either in full or in part, 
to explain the emergence and growth of terrorist organizations.70 In his study, 
Beck concludes “it is appropriate to view terrorism as one form of contentious 
politics analyzable with the conceptual framework of social movement theory.”71 
Similarly, this research examines the PKK from the perspective of social 
movement theory. 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the PKK is one of the least studied terrorist 
organizations in the world, although it is also one of the most important ones. The 
growing body of literature about the PKK is commingled with the Kurdish issue. 
Thus, many scholars examine the PKK in light of the Kurdish issue and see it as 
an extension of this problem.72 The PKK is also the subject of numerous 
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terrorism studies and security studies.73 Even though the explanatory value of 
these studies is beyond doubt, existing literature tends to fall short on the 
analytical dimension. More specifically, and more relevant to the subject of this 
study, the PKK’s organizational structure and its ability to generate resources 
have been the subject of research by various law enforcement organizations. 
Nonetheless, the functional role and importance of these components in the 
PKK’s structure are not studied in detail. 
To summarize, it is possible to examine terrorist organizations through the 
lens of the social movement theory. Additionally, while the literature on the PKK 
is heavily skewed toward the emergence of the movement and is 
characteristically descriptive rather than analytic, there are only partial analyses 
on how to disrupt the PKK. Thus, by examining the PKK through the lens of the 
contemporary social movement theory, the present study seeks to address this 
particular gap in the existing literature. 
2. Research Questions Revisited 
One of the main research questions that this study set out to answer is, 
“what are the omnipresent components of the terrorist organizations whose 
absence would disrupt the terrorist organizations?” Table 1 presents the key 
independent variables explaining social movements in accordance with 
contemporary social movement theory. 
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Table 1.   Theoretical Framework of the Social Movement Theory 
As discussed above, social movements can only emerge and sustain 
themselves in the presence of all three of these variables. Thus, examining the 
PKK through the lens of social movement theory designates these three 
variables as the key components of the PKK. Because there are numerous 
studies on the PKK that address frame-alignment processes and political 
opportunities, this study focuses on mobilizing structures, with an emphasis on 
identifying the PKK’s weak points in order to disrupt it. This study argues that 
effectively denying required resources to the PKK will cause significant friction to 
the organization and may ultimately lead to the marginalization of the PKK’s 
armed campaign. 
The second research question seeks ways to deny the PKK required 
resources and disrupt its organizational structure. This research seeks to identify 
two different ways to prevent the PKK from acquiring required resources: (1) 
targeting the organization’s financing function, and (2) targeting the armed wing’s 
physical infrastructure. The analyses in the following chapters attempt to address 
these issues to the greatest possible extent. Before analyzing these two aspects, 
however, the study turns to a brief overview of the PKK in Turkey. 
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PKK TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Turkey has been fighting against PKK terrorism since the organization’s 
formal establishment in 1978. During more than three decades, this struggle has 
been transformed, as have the variables affecting it. Among many other 
important incidents, the end of the Cold War, the Gulf Crisis in 1991, political 
problems between Turkey and its neighbors, and the capture of PKK founder and 
leader Abdullah Ocalan have all played a part in this struggle. While these events 
had significant effects on terrorist and counterterrorist strategies, they alone 
cannot explain the persistence of the PKK’s terrorist activities. This chapter’s 
purpose is to paint an objective picture of the PKK terrorist organization.  
Specifically, it aims to describe the social and political context into which the PKK 
terrorist organization was born. Furthermore, the most important characteristics 
and the physical infrastructure of the PKK are examined to better understand the 
organization’s governing dynamics. Finally, the course of more than three 
decades of PKK terror is summarized, along with milestone events in order to 
draw an all-encompassing picture of Turkey’s fight against separatist terror. 
B. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
In the late 19th century, the Ottoman Empire resorted to different ways of 
defining a nation in order to protect the unity of an ethnically diverse empire. 
Between 1876 and 1909, Sultan Adbulhamid II emphasized pan-Islamist thought, 
which aimed to unite Muslims around the world under the banner of Islam and 
the rule of the Ottoman Empire, whose Padishah also carried the title of 
caliphate. Thus, by definition Ottoman nationality embraced all Muslims. Even 
though this definition caused serious uprisings in the Balkans, which were then 
under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, it also played a vital role in uniting the 
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Turkish and Kurdish people.74 This unification strongly depended on one of the 
main characteristics of Kurdish society: strong loyalty to religion.75 Even though 
there were numerous Kurdish uprisings reaching as far as the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, none of these uprisings possessed a revolutionary nature.76 
Thus, the Kurds were a loyal member of the Ottoman nation, united under the 
banner of Islam. 
After WW I, the Ottoman Empire was forced to sign The Treaty of Sevres. 
In Section III, Articles 62 and 65 of this treaty addressed the Kurdish issue.77 In 
essence, these articles enabled the Kurdish people to establish an independent 
Kurdish State. However, the leading Kurdish figures of the time opposed the idea 
of “deserting the Turks in their hour of need and to deal them a fatal blow by 
proclaiming the independence of Kurdistan.”78 Close on the heels of the treaty 
came the War of Independence, which ultimately gave birth to the Republic of 
Turkey. Throughout the war, Kurds fought side-by-side with Turks among many 
other people from different ethnic backgrounds who together formed the Turkish 
nation. How then should the Kurdish uprising prior to the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic be understood? It may be best to view it as a local power 
struggle among the Kurdish tribes trying to obtain local power and secure 
privileges from the Ottoman Empire. 
An important change that separated the newly formed Turkish Republic 
from the Ottoman Empire was in its political structure. The Ottoman Empire was 
a monarchy that was ruled in accordance with Islamic law. By contrast, Turkey is 
a secular democratic republic. As mentioned, one of the focal characteristics of 
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the Kurdish society is its strong loyalty to religion; another important 
characteristic is its tribal structure. This change in the political structure of Turkish 
society in its transition from monarchy to democracy affected the fundamental 
characteristics of the Kurdish society. First, the secular nature of the new regime 
was at odds with the Islamic rule of law that Kurdish society upheld. Second, 
democracy in its essence jeopardized the political power of the feudal tribal 
structure of the Kurdish society.79 As the Turkish republic deprived the sheiks of 
their religious and feudal power, several major rebellions took place, such as 
Seyh Said in 1925, or Seyyit Riza in 1937. Additionally, many minor uprisings 
took place between 1925 and 1950, particularly in the area where majority of the 
residents were Kurds.80 Interestingly, these uprisings served to transform the 
public perception of nationalism, which in turn shaped the Kurdish perception of 
the new social structure in a positive way. As a result, the second quarter of the 
20th century witnessed the birth of a new Turkish state and the gradual 
integration of Kurdish society into this new system. 
As a result of the 1950 elections, Turkey transformed into a multi-party 
democracy and a more liberal political structure was formed. Under the rule of 
the Democrat Party, winner of the first multi-party elections, increased freedom of 
expression allowed all, including the Kurds, to express their complaints.81  The 
more pluralistic and open political environment of the 1950s and 1960s enabled 
Kurds to participate in different aspects of the country’s social and political life.82 
Moreover, the 1950s also saw the rapid improvement of material conditions and 
the birth of the Turkish bourgeoisie. However, because Turkey’s economy was 
not able to finance this rapid improvement, the economy experienced high 
inflation and the country’s solvency could only be sustained by foreign, mainly 
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American, aid.83 Left-leaning student groups found the answer to the country’s 
economic problems in Marxist ideology.84 Eventually, the left-wing movements of 
the late 1960s gave way to radical socialist movements such as Dev-Genc and 
terrorism took its toll on Turkish democracy, resulting in a military coup. 
Under the government formed by the military between 1971 and 1973, 
radical political violence came to a stop.85 Throughout this period, Kurdish 
socialism grew alongside the broader Turkish socialist movement.86 Ultimately, 
the Turkish left’s rejection of the Kurdish socialist’s nationalistic tendencies led to 
the formation of the PKK, which later turned against the Kurdish religious and 
tribal leaders and other Turkish revolutionary groups, adopting the practices of 
violence and terror.87 
The historical context in which the PKK’s terrorist activities commenced 
challenges the common fallacy of seeing the PKK’s rise as an expression of the 
political desires of Turkish citizens with Kurdish ethnicity. The Kurdish people had 
been a part of the Turkish nation dating back to the War of Independence. The 
revolutionary change that came with the establishment of the republic affected 
the Kurdish people as much as it did other segments of the community. However, 
the parts of the Turkish community that came from diverse ethnic backgrounds 
successfully integrated in subsequent years under the new national definition of 
Kemalism. Increasingly, the Kurdish people sought solutions for their problems 
and complaints within the democratic system. Thus, as Turkish democracy grew 
stronger, differences within Turkey were diminished with political solutions. The 
late 1960s and early 1970s marked a worldwide era of student protests and 
increased extremist thought. Turkey had its share of left and right wing terrorism 
in this era, and social order could only be restored with a military coup. After a 
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mere 2 years of peace under the government established by the coup, political 
extremist violence erupted. Born in these circumstances, the PKK claimed to be 
the voice of the Kurdish people. On the contrary, regardless of its historical 
endurance, the PKK is merely another radical ethno-nationalist terrorist 
organization that splintered from left-wing extremist groups of the era. 
C. UNDERSTANDING THE PKK: GOVERNING DYNAMICS 
Apart from its ideology and the real world implementation of this ideology, 
the PKK has four characteristics that define the organization’s fundamental 
alignment. 
First, the PKK is a cult of personality.88 Abdullah Ocalan, the founder and 
leader of the PKK, is the symbol of Kurdish nationalism to PKK supporters and 
sympathizers.89 He is known as “Apo,” which is a diminutive for Abdullah, and 
the word also means “uncle” in Kurdish. PKK members are called “Apocu” 
(Apoist), and the word is synonymous with the PKK.90 Turkish security forces 
captured Apo in 1999, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment on an island 
prison in Turkey. Nonetheless, communicating with the PKK through his lawyers, 
he has continued to determine the PKK’s strategy from within prison.91 
Furthermore, Abdullah Ocalan’s imprisonment has arguably increased his 
existing high esteem among PKK members, giving him the image of a living 
martyr.92  Initially, Turkey was able to use this cult of personality as an 
advantage, as the capture and imprisonment of Abdullah Ocalan caused severe 
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demoralization in the PKK.93 Nonetheless, Abdullah Ocalan’s ability to rule the 
PKK from his prison cell diminished the Turkish government’s advantage quickly 
and caused some degree of public discontent. Abdullah Ocalan is an important 
part of the PKK terrorist organization, and even after being imprisoned, he plays 
a crucial role in determining the ideology and the course of the PKK’s activities.  
Second, the PKK follows Maoist ideology to the greatest possible extent.94 
Abdullah Ocalan favored Maoism, finding the Marxist-Leninsts of the 1970s It is 
possible that Ocalan first fell in with Marxist teachings as a student of political 
science at Ankara University, which at that time was ideologically influenced by 
the Marxist thought by some of its professors.95 Abdullah Ocalan was born and 
raised in a village in southeastern Anatolia and personally experienced the rural 
feudal values and the social structure of the area. When combined with his 
education, his political ideas favored both Marxist revolution and Maoist guerilla 
warfare tactics.96 Consequently, the PKK was designed to establish a left-wing 
Kurdish state by liberating the so-called oppressed and exploited Kurdish worker-
peasant alliance, where the peasantry would provide the manpower for the 
people’s army.97 Since 1978, this vision has caused the deaths of more than 
30,000 Kurdish peasants.98 
Third, the PKK aims to monopolize the Kurdish nationalist struggle.99 The 
PKK has continuously and consistently attempted to intimidate and even to 
eradicate political entities that in some way related themselves to the Turkish 
Kurds.100 One of the most renowned instances of this is the PKK’s clash with 
Turkish Hizbullah, a right-wing extremist terrorist organization whose members 
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were mainly Kurds, which operated in southeastern urban areas of Turkey.101 
The PKK also decimated Revolutionary Unity of People, the Liberation of the 
People, and the Revolutionary East Cultural Association.102 In addition to these 
violent extremist groups, the PKK eradicated peaceful Kurdish political parties 
such as the Kurdistan Socialist Party.103 The PKK even manipulates the Kurdish 
politicians that officially represent Turkish Kurds in the Turkish National 
Parliament.104 In sum, neither the Turkish government nor any other 
nongovernmental movement has been able to create an entity that would 
express the complaints of Turkey’s Kurds in a peaceful and democratic 
framework. 
A final fundamental characteristic of the PKK terrorist organization is its 
dependence on foreign patrons.105 During the Cold War, the PKK enjoyed the 
physical and economic support of Soviet surrogate countries such as Syria.106 
The PKK had training camps in Lebanon’s Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley.107 
Moreover, Abdullah Ocalan resided in a safe house in Syria until his forced 
deportation in 1998.108 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria continued to 
support the PKK, albeit this time its support was the result of bilateral political 
problems with Turkey.109 Likewise, Iran and Iraq have also supported the PKK 
covertly and have used it as a bargaining chip in their relations with Turkey,110 
especially in the wake of the First Gulf War, when “Operation Provide Comfort” 
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created a Kurdish zone in the northern region of Iraq. The PKK skillfully took 
advantage of this political vacuum to establish a safe heaven for its 
operations.111 The PKK has also enjoyed the support of local political parties in 
the northern region of Iraq, such as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and 
later the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).112 The Greek113 and Armenian114 
governments also found the existence of the PKK useful and did not hesitate to 
support it when it suited their own interests. The PKK finances its movement, 
provides recruits, and seeks political support for its cause in Western Europe as 
well.115 
Consequently, the PKK has enjoyed the excessive sponsorship of foreign 
patrons. Different groups have supported the PKK for their own interests under 
different political contexts. External support had significant effects on the 
manpower, training, and financing operations of the PKK. With the help of these 
immense sponsorships, the PKK was able to establish safe heavens to generate 
funds116, set up the physical infrastructure to support its terrorist activities, and 
create an international diaspora to promote its cause and muster political 
support.117 
D. UNDERSTANDING THE PKK: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The PKK has a very hierarchical organizational structure; Abdullah Ocalan 
has dominated the PKK’s leadership from its very beginning. Other than minor 
changes over time, the PKK has had two different organizational structures. The 
initial structure was preserved with minor, but necessary, changes until the 
                                            
111 FAS, “A Case Study of the PKK in Turkey,” n.p. 
112 Cagatay, “Can the PKK Renounce Violence?” n.p. 
113 Cagatay, “Can the PKK Renounce Violence?” n.p. 
114 FAS, “A Case Study of the PKK in Turkey,” n.p. 
115 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “PKK,” n.p. 
116 Cagatay, “Can the PKK Renounce Violence?” n.p. 
117 Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror, 35–36. 
 33
reorganization of the PKK in 2005. The second organizational structure, which 
arose from the 2005 reorganization, is still in effect today. 
 
Figure 1.   Organizational Structure of the PKK Before 2005 
The PKK’s functional organization, until its reorganization in 2005, is 
shown in Figure 1.  Prior to 2005, the PKK’s structure consisted of a “Central 
Executive Committee” that presided over a “Central Committee,” whose 
secretary general was Abdullah Ocalan.118 As a result, Ocalan ruled the PKK 
with absolute and unchallenged power.119 Amongst many other sub-committees 
attached to the Central Committee, the two most important were the military and 
external central committees. After the Third Congress of the PKK in 1986, the 
military sub-committee was renamed the Kurdistan People’s Liberation Army 
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(Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan, or ARGK).120 The external operations center 
was called the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (Eniya Rizgariya Netewa 
Kurdistan, or ERNK), which was established in 1985 and began to operate in 
1989. While the ERNK undertook propaganda activities, recruited new militants, 
conducted militant training, established contact with other armed groups, 
generated funds, and provided intelligence and counterintelligence for 
operational security, the ARNK was responsible for armed attacks directed at 
Turkey.121 
 
Figure 2.   Organizational Structure of the PKK After 2005 
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In February 2005, the PKK reorganized its structure under the guidance of 
Ocalan, as illustrated in Figure 2.122 The People’s Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra 
Gele Kurdistan, or KONGRA-GEL) is the legislature and presides over Kurdish 
Democratic Federation (Koma Komalen Kurdistan, or KKK).123 The KKK is the 
new executive committee, and it consists of a series of hierarchically-formed 
regional committees.124 In theory, the regional committees are formed in league 
with the laws and governmental structures of the countries in which Kurds live.125 
The raison d’être of the regional committees is to remove the need for Kurdish 
autonomy or independence through unifying and coordinating the efforts of the 
regional committees. Regional committees are formed in countries where 
Kurdish people live. In theory, these committees regulate the relationships 
among Kurdish citizens in the country where they are established so that the 
Kurdish citizens can live as members of an autonomous or independent entity. 
Nonetheless, none of these committees has been formed in practice.126  The 
militants belong to the People’s Defense Force (Hezen Parastina Gel, or 
HPG).127 The HPG is divided into regional commands and these commands are 
further divided into units, which consist of eight to twenty militants.128 The cells or 
individuals responsible for bombing campaigns are directly under the command 
of HPG leadership in Qandil Mountain.129  
In theory, the power flows from bottom to top in the KKK, yet in practice it 
is imposed from the top down.130 Ocalan designates the ideology and strategic 
objectives of the PKK, and the KKK executive committee handles the day-to-day 
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running of the organization within the parameters set by Ocalan.131 Today, 
Nurettin Sofi heads the HPG, the financial chief of the PKK is Duran Kalkan, and 
the strongest figure in the leadership is Murat Karayilan, who is a hard-line 
Ocalan loyalist.132 
Consequently, throughout its lifetime, the PKK has had a strongly 
hierarchical organizational structure. The original structure of the terrorist 
organization was more inclined to functionality than its current structure; the 
organization was departmentalized according to functional processes. However, 
the pause in PKK operations between 1999 and 2004, as well as its inclination to 
a political solution, required a new structure that would match reality. This 
transformation was completed in 2005, although nothing has changed in reality 
because the transformation depended on the establishment of regional 
committees with considerable political power within the legal systems of multiple 
countries. PKK members staffed these regional committees, and thus real-world 
functionality was never the true intention behind their formation.133 It would not 
be incorrect to assert that the organizational transformation of the PKK did not 
change much in practice. 
E. THREE DECADES OF PKK TERROR 
The PKK terrorist organization was founded as a Marxist-Leninist 
group.134 The initial objective of the PKK was to form a left-wing Kurdish state 
espousing Marxist revolutionary ideology, and Maoist guerilla warfare tactics 
were chosen to realize this objective.135 The PKK declared that it was not a 
nationalist secessionist movement several times, reiterating this issue in its 
                                            
131 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “PKK,” n.p. 
132 Cagatay, “Can the PKK Renounce Violence?” n.p. 
133 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “PKK,” n.p. 
134 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “PKK,” n.p. 
135 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, “PKK,” n.p. 
 37
congresses.136 However, in practice the PKK continued to carry out its strategy 
of revolution within the Kurdish population and as a result created a rift between 
Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnic background and the rest of Turkish society. 
Thus, the PKK held true to the characteristics of ethno-nationalist separatist and 
Marxist extremist groups. However, in time the PKK shifted its emphasis from 
one side of its fundamental ideology to the other in an attempt to adapt to 
changes in the global political scene. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1980s resulted in the PKK 
downplaying Marxism-Leninism and emphasizing Kurdish nationalism more.137 
Changes to the PKK flag clearly illustrate this changed emphasis. As shown in 
Figure 3, the hammer and sickle figures in the organization’s flag have been 
removed in the current version. 
 
              1978–1996       1996–2002 
Figure 3.   The PKK’s Flags 
With its Marxist–Leninist roots, the PKK initially denounced religion, but by 
the mid-1990s, it had to downplay this ideology in order to adapt to the changing  
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international political context, and prevent the alienation of the Kurdish society.138 
The PKK’s revised attitude toward religion was an attempt to protect its support 
base. 
The PKK was established at a 1974 meeting of a group of leftist Kurdish 
students in the Fis village of Diyarbakir, a city in southeast Turkey, which had 
assembled to form the National Liberation Army (Ulusal Kurtulus Ordusu, or 
UKO) and which appointed Abdullah Ocalan as their leader.139 Later on, this 
assembly would be viewed as the first meeting of the PKK, as the UKO changed 
its name to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, or PKK) in 
1978.140 The PKK targeted the Kurdish tribal leaders and fought with other rival 
left and right wing extremist groups until the military coup of 1980.141 The 1980 
military coup pushed the PKK to a new stage, with its members either in prison or 
having fled to neighboring Syria. Abdullah Ocalan also fled Turkey and 
established a PKK training camp in the Bekaa valley, under Syrian control.142 
Between 1980 and 1984, the terrorist organization established its military wing 
and increased its ranks.143 
In 1984, the PKK changed its strategy. Ocalan declared that the PKK had 
chosen Mao’s Public Revolution style to achieve its main objectives and began 
using violent tactics.144 August 15, 1984 marked the beginning of a massive 
campaign of violence. Starting in 1986 and gradually increasing from then on, 
“the PKK stepped up its attacks on southeast Turkey, targeting state officials, the 
security forces, schoolteachers, and the family members of the village 
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guards.”145 The PKK deliberately attacked and literally “leveled” remote villages 
that supported the government or that did not support the PKK.146 
Until 1991, the PKK’s attacks were confined to the southeastern region of 
Turkey. Beginning that year, the PKK increased its area of operations and 
targeted major cities in the western regions of Turkey with bombing attacks. In 
August 1991, the Turkish Armed Forces conducted the first cross-border attack 
against PKK bases in Iraq.147 These attacks would total 24 by 1999.148 The first 
years of the 1990s witnessed a successful military counterterrorism campaign by 
the Turkish government. 
In 1993, Abdullah Ocalan declared the first of what would be many so-
called unilateral ceasefires. This ceasefire was adopted as a strategic tactic to 
mislead public opinion about the terrorist nature of the PKK, and was aimed at 
fulfilling the PKK’s objectives through legal means, which the PKK had not been 
able to accomplish with its ongoing terrorist campaign.149 
As an extension of the proliferation of its terrorist actions in the major 
western Turkish cities in 1991, the PKK started an intensive bombing campaign 
that targeted Turkey’s tourism centers in 1994.150 Also, as a part of its declared 
ideology and strategy, the PKK formed an alliance with the Revolutionary 
People’s Liberation Party/Front (Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi, or 
DHKP/C), another militant left-wing terrorist group operating in Turkey.151 
However, it turned out to be a short-lived and weak alliance. In March 1998, the 
DHKP/C declared that its alliance with the PKK was over.152 
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In May 1995, the PKK held its Fifth Conference. One of the important 
decisions arising from this meeting was to intensify its suicide bombing 
activities.153 As a result, the PKK became one of the world’s terrorist 
organizations that resort to suicide attacks. The PKK carried out 21 suicide 
attacks between June 1996 and July 1999, causing relatively insignificant loss of 
life when compared to other terrorist organizations’ suicide campaigns.154 
Beginning in 1996, the Turkish military campaign effectively countered the 
organization and forced the PKK militants deeper into the mountains.155 This 
continuous pressure on the PKK, as well as Turkey’s military build-up on the 
Syrian border demanding the delivery of Abdullah Ocalan, ultimately forced Syria 
to expel Ocalan from Damascus in October 1998.156 After a series of 
international deportations, Ocalan was captured in Kenya with a Greek Cypriot 
passport on February 15, 1999.157 After his capture, Ocalan ordered PKK 
militants to leave Turkey and to stop its armed attacks in an effort to minimize his 
punishment and to prevent the organization from self-destructing by overreacting 
to his capture.158 
Between 1999 and 2004, the PKK engaged only in defensive operations, 
yet it maintained about 5000 active militants.159 The PKK resorted largely to civil 
disobedience-type actions throughout this time period, albeit with little 
success.160 The PKK was renamed the Kurdistan Democratic and Freedom 
Congress (Kongra Azadi u Demokrasiya Kurdistan, or KADEK) in 2002, and the 
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Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongre Gele Kurdistan, KONGRA-GEL) in 2003, 
in an attempt to be removed or omitted from lists of terrorist organizations kept by 
various international entities. However, both the United States and the European 
Union included the PKK/KONGRA-GEL on their lists of terrorist organization in 
2004.161 One month after the PKK’s designation as a terrorist organization, 
Ocalan ordered the resumption of its armed campaign. The emergence of both 
rival Kurdish groups and of factions within the PKK played an important role in 
this decision.162 The years 2005 and 2006 witnessed a number of internal 
confrontations, where members of the PKK who supported a peaceful political 
solution were assassinated by the hard-line PKK leadership.163 
In 2005, the PKK resumed using its former name, as well as changing its 
mission statement and adopting pan-Kurdish thought.164 The PKK employed this 
strategy in an attempt to unite all Kurdish movements under one umbrella.165 
Moreover, the PKK’s main objective was moderated to claim cultural and political 
rights for the ethnic Kurdish population in Turkey.166 Nonetheless, the PKK’s 
ethnic minority, federation, and autonomous governance demands go far beyond 
simple cultural and political rights, and principally serve as a means of dividing 
the Turkish Republic. 
Between 2005 and 2008, the PKK increased its terrorist attacks. While 
sustaining minimal rural activity and keeping a small footprint in the rural areas, 
the organization resorted to urban bombings and civil disobedience-type acts.167 
In the meantime, 2006 saw Turkey, the United States, and Iraq establishing an 
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inter-governmental pact to fight against the PKK.168 The United States agreed to 
provide actionable intelligence to Turkey under the terms of this mutual pact. 
In 2009, the Turkish government started pressing hard with legislative 
reforms in order to disband the PKK for good. Several disputed issues, such as 
enhancing opportunities of language education and television broadcasts in 
Kurdish have been regulated. In October, eight PKK militants crossed the border 
to surrender as peace ambassadors.169 While the Turkish government evaluated 
this development as the end of an era (namely the end of armed propaganda), 
the PKK viewed it as the beginning of a peace process, where they would be 
allowed to participate in the political process along with Abdullah Ocalan 
representing the Kurdish population of Turkey.170 Later, it turned out that both the 
PKK and the Turkish Government had misread the developments; as the PKK 
resumed its terrorist activities and still claims that the conditions to end the armed 
struggle have not been met and that the Kurdish people will not be represented 
properly if the PKK gives up its armed struggle. As of 2010, while significantly 
marginalized when compared to the first terrorist campaign of 1978–1999, the 
PKK is still far from dissolving. Recently, the PKK has increased the level of 
terrorist attacks and continues its terror campaign with the strategy of attrition. 
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IV. BLOODY MONEY: PKK FUNDING 
Global corporations are in a constant race to increase their market share. 
It takes the best-educated workforce, the most experienced managers, and the 
most creative and innovative marketing strategies for successful companies to 
grow and profit. Even though these companies are legal and pursue no other 
ends than making profit with their actions, thousands of corporations go bankrupt 
every year. The question is, then, how does the PKK and other illegal terrorist 
organizations raise enough funds to run their operations while the law 
enforcement agencies track and intercept their financial activities on a global 
level? 
Terrorist organizations are inherently illegal and illicit. The PKK is not an 
exception. Countries follow and intercept the activities of terrorist organizations to 
the greatest possible extent. Even under these limiting circumstances, the PKK 
manages to raise sufficient funds to sustain and even seemingly to improve its 
organizational capabilities. 
This chapter analyzes the fundamentals of terrorism financing and 
particularly examines the PKK in this area. The study first presents the sources 
that terrorist organizations utilize to raise funds, along with their advantages and 
disadvantages, and then discusses how the PKK uses those particular sources 
to generate funds. Following these analyses, the chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the conditions that augment fund-raising activities. 
A. SOURCES OF FUNDING 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the last decade of the 20th century 
marked the end of an era. As the Cold War ended, the superpowers’ economic 
support of various countries and international groups also diminished. Social 
groups and organizations in the supported countries, which raised their funds 
through state sponsorship, lost their material support. Moreover, as the strict 
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supervision of the supported countries abated, these social groups and 
organizations had the opportunity to materialize their organizational and political 
objectives. While some of these groups pursued their patriotic visions peacefully 
and legally, others turned to terrorist initiatives. The new initiatives were in 
addition to seasoned, long-term global terrorist groups such as FARC, ETA, 
Hezbollah, and many others. 
Giraldo and Trinkunas171 state that the end of the Cold War was a turning 
point in both the structures of terrorist organizations (e.g., the rise of 
transnational radical religious terrorism) and their financing operations. They also 
argue that the effects of globalism played a significant role in providing ample 
opportunities for terrorists to widen their spectrum of fund-raising activities. The 
conditions that favor terrorist organizations raising funds will be discussed in later 
sections. When examining terrorist financing sources, however, the shape of the 
global and regional political arena should be kept in mind, inasmuch as changes 
in the political environment, such as the global war against terrorism, can 
significantly affect the organizational and ideological structure of terrorist 
organizations and require revisions in their fund-raising efforts. Like any other 
enterprise, terrorist organizations tend to widen the spectrum from which they 
can generate funds in order to guarantee a minimum amount of income; they 
also shift their efforts to another source in the case of losing one of their fund-
raising assets. Every asset available to terrorist organizations comes with 
advantages and disadvantages. Understanding these factors also helps analysts 
to designate the weak points of terrorist financing efforts. 
When one examines its sources of fund-raising, like every other terrorist 
organization, the PKK has its own unique footprint. The following analysis will 
reveal that the amount of resources, as well as the sources that these resources 
are obtained from has changed significantly throughout the PKK’s lifetime. In an 
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effort to understand and engage the full spectrum of the PKK’s funding sources, 
the research makes an effort to thoroughly examine the financing function of the 
PKK. 
1. State Sponsorship 
a. Advantages and Disadvantages of State Sponsorship 
Before the end of the Cold War, state sponsorship was the most 
pervasive source of money for terrorist organizations. When sponsored by a 
state, terrorist organizations can raise significant amounts of money and 
guarantee a steady income.172 States also provide tactical and diplomatic cover 
for the supported terrorist organizations’ actions. State sponsorship can provide 
access to professional training, physical sanctuary, and a disruption-free system 
for the flow of funds, and these support assets are not mutually exclusive. 
Furthermore, an alliance with a state provides noticeable credentials for terrorist 
organizations in the international arena, making it easier to muster support from 
transnational groups and providing a strong case in legitimizing their case. 
However, there are some drawbacks to state sponsorship for 
terrorist organizations. Despite the fact that states provide significant amounts of 
money via disruption-free networks, they also tend to be unreliable. Changes in 
the international arena, public opinion, and policy on certain issues can make 
states unreliable resources.173 Another constraint is the high amount of control 
that states demand in the techniques and actions of terrorist organizations.174 
States may want to limit the targets, timing, scope, frequency and intensity of 
attacks. Another possible drawback can be the emergence of rival terrorist 
organizations competing for the same resources. Finally, terrorist organizations 
must consider the negative effects of an alliance with a state, as this alliance can 
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prove to be contradictory to the essence of that terrorist organization. For 
instance, if a radical Islamist terrorist organization is attempting to establish a 
sharia-based government instead of a democratic one, it will not help this 
particular terrorist organization to make an alliance with another state that is not 
ruled by the sharia. 
b. PKK and State Sponsorship 
The PKK terrorist organization has enjoyed the support of multiple 
state sponsors throughout its lifetime. These sponsors have provided the PKK 
with a plethora of resources ranging from training camps to political support. 
(1) Greece. The state sponsorship of the PKK by Greece 
has its roots in the “Lavrion Camp,” where Kurdish fugitives of Turkish nationality 
were held in the 1980s.175 According to Sehirli, the Greek secret service has 
used these Kurdish fugitives in demonstrations and civil disobedience-type 
actions that were held against Turkey in Greece and, beginning in 1982, explicitly 
accommodated DHKP/C and PKK militants in Athens.176 
The sponsorship of Greece gradually increased through the 
1990s. It allowed the PKK to open multiple offices within its borders and to hold 
PKK office meetings with official members of the government on more than one 
occasion.177 It also provided political and military training to PKK militants in the 
Lavrion Camp, on the island of Kos, and at two more camps in close proximity to 
Athens.178 On multiple occasions, Greece financially supported the PKK and 
even started a fundraising campaign with the motto “200 Million Drachma for 
Kurdistan—Aegean Peace is Provided from Kurdistan Mountains.”179 
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Greece also provided diplomatic and political support to the 
PKK. In addition to explicit official visits to the PKK camps in Lebanon and public 
meetings that sympathized with the establishment of a Kurdish state on Turkish 
soil, Greece masterfully used its political position in the European Union (then the 
European Community) to pass communiqués that promoted Kurdish 
independence.180 Finally, Greece provided implicit support to the PKK terrorist 
organization through nongovernmental organizations established by the 
government.181 
(2) Syria. One of the most committed state sponsors of the 
PKK is Syria. First, Syria provided shelter for PKK founder and leader Abdullah 
Ocalan from July 7, 1979 to October 16, 1998, either in its capital, Damascus, or 
in Lebanon’s Bekaa valley, then under its physical control.182 The Bekaa valley 
has been the home and militant training facility of many terrorist organizations 
other than the PKK. Some of these terrorist organizations are Japanese Red 
Army, Italian Red Brigades, IRA, ETA, Corsica Terror Teams, Hamas, and 
Hezbollah.183 From 1992 to 1998, Syria hosted three Greek, one German, one 
Italian, and two English official committees that visited Abdullah Ocalan either in 
Damascus or in the Bekaa valley.184 
There are several reasons behind Syria’s support of the 
PKK: (1) Turkish annexation of Hatay province in 1939; (2) Southeast Anatolia 
Project of Turkey, which redirected the waters of the Euphrates river; (3) 
historical grievances left over from the Ottoman rule; and (4) Hafez Assad’s, 
former president of Syria, desire for regional power.185 
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Recently, Syria’s support of the PKK ceased partly because 
of Turkey’s active counterterrorism policy in the region, and partly because of 
Syria’s attempts to change the international actors’ perception of Syria’s well-
established state sponsorship of terrorism. Syria even undertook successful law 
enforcement measures that banned the PKK in the country, conducted raids, and 
imprisoned PKK militants.186 Bessar Esad, the current president of Syria, have 
officially denounced PKK terror and announced that Syria will not allow any 
terrorist organization to operate within its borders.187  
(3) Russia. Russia’s support of the PKK is commingled with 
the historical enmity between Turks and Russians. Russia supported Kurdish 
uprisings implicitly in 1920s, and played a significant role in the 1937 Tunceli 
revolt.188 During the Cold War era, through the use of clandestine radio stations 
(e.g., Our Radio and the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party), Russia 
employed communist propaganda and also addressed Kurds.189 Russia kept the 
Kurdish issue as a trump card in its hands against Turkey. For instance, in 1995, 
the PKK held its Third Congress in Moscow; in 1996, a KGB official announced 
that Russia did not recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization; on the contrary, 
Russia defined the PKK as “the leader of the Kurdish national democratic 
struggle” and declared that the Kurds were its allies.190 
Russia also supported the PKK implicitly through its proxy 
state in the Middle East: Syria.191 Russians provided political support in Syria, 
training and resources to the PKK, and supervised the PKK terrorist organization 
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to some extent.192 There were two PKK camps 285 kilometers from Moscow, and 
intelligence reports stated the PKK’s involvement in Moscow’s gambling mafia 
and extortion from prostitution.193 
(4) Iraq. The PKK established its main bases of operation 
and camps in the northern region of Iraq more than two decades ago.194 The 
PKK had its first bases in Iraq in the area under the control of the KDP (Kurdistan 
Democratic Party), and up to the present, all of its camps and main bases are 
located in this region and supported by Massoud Barzani.195 The PKK’s 12 main 
and 28 smaller camps are scattered along the Iraq-Turkey border and all of the 
camps are in the KDP-controlled region.196 Thus, the northern region of Iraq has 
always been a geographical safe haven for the PKK, in part because of the 
security vacuum on the part of Iraqi governments, and in part because the ethnic 
background of the PKK coordinates well with the strong actors in the area. 
Additionally, the KDP and the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) neither in the 
past nor in the present have the military might needed to eradicate the camps of 
the PKK should they choose to do so.197 Furthermore, Jalal Talabani, the leader 
of the PUK, also admitted that the PUK has given material and weapons support 
to the PKK.198 The central Iraqi government is known to have supplied weapons 
to the PKK between 1987 and 1989 in return for information on KDP forces.199 
The PKK have established alliances with both the KDP and the PUK, though 
never at the same time.200 Thus, the PKK has played its ethnicity card well 
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against the local powers in the northern region of Iraq. Even now, the PKK’s main 
base, which is located on the Qandil Mountains, is in the PUK-controlled area, 
while its bases are located in the KDP-controlled area. 
More recently, both the Iraqi government and the KRG have 
denounced the ways of the PKK and have become founding members of the 
information exchange committee between Turkey, the United States, and Iraq on 
fighting PKK terrorism. Nonetheless, the lack of military might, ethnic 
resemblance, and a political vacuum in Iraq prevent the Iraqi government from 
carrying out an effective counterterrorism campaign against the PKK. 
(5) Iran. During the First Gulf War (1980–1988), both Iran 
and Iraq armed the other side’s Kurdish populations as allies.201 The PKK has 
also benefitted from Iran’s support to KDP. During the First Gulf War the KDP 
and the PKK were in an alliance, and the KPD transferred resources acquired 
from Iran, such as weapons and funds, to the PKK. Furthermore, unlike Iraq, Iran 
refused to let Turkish armed forces pursue the PKK militants within its borders.202 
There were also several PKK camps in Iran until the end of 1990s.203 Iran’s 
support of international terrorism is a well-established and proven fact. Even 
though Iran officially denies such claims, Turkey has empirically demonstrated 
that the Iranian government has provided training, accommodation, weapons, 
ammunition, campsites, and other logistical support to the PKK.204 
On the other hand, the after United States’ occupation of 
Iraq, Iran feared the emergence of a Kurdish state in the northern regions of Iraq 
and designated the PKK as a terrorist organization in 2004.205 The very same 
year the PJAK, a proxy terrorist organization of the PKK, was established. Even 
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though there have not been any joint or coordinated counterterrorism operations 
with Turkey, Iran runs its own campaign against the PJAK and the PKK.206 
(6) Armenia. As Syria, the grievances of Armenians with 
Turkey date back to WW I. Apart from their support of the Kurdish uprisings of 
the 1920s, Armenians have cooperated with the Kurds in an effort to realize their 
so-called “Great Armenia: utopia.207 ASALA (the Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia) declared an alliance with the PKK in 1980, and ASALA 
members were reported to be operating with the PKK in the late 1980s.208 
Especially after the cross-border operations of Turkey in the early 1990s, the 
PKK realized that it was not totally safe to operate from within Iraq as it had 
before. The PKK then contacted the new Armenian state, formed after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union; Armenia provided the PKK with accommodations, 
shelter in the ethnically Kurdish villages and regions, recruitment opportunities, 
money, and military and political training.209 Armenia officially met PKK 
representatives and signed a joint action plan against Turkey in Beirut, and when 
Abdullah Ocalan declared a ceasefire in May 1993, the Armenians reprimanded 
the PKK by referring to this joint action plan.210 
(7) The United States. There are several arguments as to 
why and to what extent the United States supported the PKK. One of the well-
known incidents include Jalal Talabani’s Washington visit in 1988 immediately 
after signing an accord with the PKK.211 Another argument points out the United 
States’ desire to establish a weak land state in the Middle East to use as a 
regional base.212 Especially some activities related to Operation Provide Comfort 
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drew significant attention. Many Turkish sources claim that Operation Provide 
Comfort forces clandestinely provided logistical support to the PKK, and were 
allied with Jalal Talabani in Iraq, who also supported the PKK.213 
On the other hand, none of these arguments was ever 
proven to be true. The United States never engaged the PKK physically, but it did 
designate the PKK as a terrorist organization in 1997, and re-designated it as a 
terrorist organization in 1999 and 2001;214 finally, in 2004, the United States 
included all front organizations of the PKK in this designation and stated that “the 
PKK/KADEK, under any alias, is a terrorist organization, and no name change or 
press release can alter that fact.”215 Furthermore, the United States agreed to 
provide instant actionable intelligence to Turkey about PKK militants, and an 
organization was formed with the participation of Turkey, the United States, and 
Iraq in order to demobilize the PKK. Operation Provide Comfort had the effect of 
reducing the political power of the Iraqi government in the northern regions of the 
country, and created a security vacuum in the area, which the PKK successfully 
manipulated to its own needs. The United States, however, provided explicit 
political support to some extent in the international arena on Turkey’s 
counterterrorism campaign. Thus, the United States can be classified as an 
unwitting state sponsor, whose policies’ second order effects provided indirect 
support to the PKK. 
(8) Other Countries. Some Western European countries 
have provided political support to the PKK and turned a blind eye to the PKK’s 
actions within their borders either because of the fear of retaliation from the PKK 
terrorist organization, or as an extension of their policy options against Turkey. 
These countries enabled the PKK to generate funds, conduct separatist 
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propaganda and provide awareness for the PKK’s cause by commingling the 
Kurdish issue with the PKK’s armed campaign against official international 
organizations, such as the United Nations. They have also turned a blind eye 
while the PKK recruited, trained, indoctrinated militants, extorted the population, 
or taxed the sympathizers of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe.216 Unfortunately 
France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Italy, and England have supported 
the PKK terrorist organization on these issues to some extent. 
When examining state sponsorship of terrorism, there are 
two important points to note. First, states almost never explicitly accept that they 
are sponsoring terrorist organizations. Second, unlike other material resources, 
the monetary value of safe havens, political support, professional training, and 
turning a blind eye to the activities of the terrorist organizations cannot be 
measured. Thus, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to name monetary 
amounts raised through state sponsorship. 
Overall, the PKK relied heavily on state sponsorship from its 
establishment to late 1990s. Throughout this phase, the PKK was mainly 
sponsored “by Syria and other states interested in weakening Turkey.”217 “In 
1998, Syria cut its ties with the PKK after Turkey threatened to invade [Syria,] 
what was then the group’s primary sanctuary.”218 Especially after the capture of 
Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK’s armed campaign drastically decreased, as did its 
need for material resources. In an unprecedented development, the United 
States’ declaration of a global war on terror also helped to create sensitivity 
about sponsoring terrorist organizations in the international arena. Iran’s policy 
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shift on the PKK diminished the all-time low state support for the PKK even 
further.219 Thus, the PKK lost its state support as these factors came in to play.  
Nonetheless, the PKK terrorist organization, known for its 
high adaptability to changing environments, had other funding resources at hand 
to compensate for this loss. Beginning with Syria’s policy change, the PKK 
terrorist organization funded its campaign independently from state sponsors.220 
2. Illegal Activities 
a. Advantages and Disadvantages of Illegal Activities 
Terrorist organizations can raise funds through illegal activities, 
such as smuggling, petty theft, sales of pirated goods, and kidnapping for 
ransom. Terrorist organizations can obtain funds relatively quickly by utilizing 
criminal activities.221 In addition, these methods are easily accessible. Cities and 
other population centers are ideal for armed theft, credit card theft, fraud, 
counterfeiting, intellectual property theft, and kidnapping. Furthermore, criminal 
activities such as kidnapping and armed robbery do not demand high skill and 
expertise to conduct.222 Thus, it provides a certain amount of independence to 
terrorist groups. For other illegal activities that require expertise, such as identity 
theft, counterfeiting, and trafficking in persons and smuggling of goods, terrorists 
can outsource the required expertise from other criminal groups.223 Resorting to 
illegal activities also undermines the incumbent authority by challenging the 
state’s security apparatus and disrupting public order. Even if that is an 
unintended consequence, it serves the fundamental principles of terrorist 
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organizations well: to weaken state authority and establish their own rule over the 
population. Moreover, small-scale illegal activities leave small footprints and can 
be hard to trace back to terrorist organizations.224 On the other hand, narcotics 
and smuggling remain the most significant activities that terrorist groups employ 
to generate funds.225 Establishing an adequate infrastructure to run these kinds 
of operations, however, requires high levels of expertise and makes terrorist 
organizations highly visible to authorities. Thus, getting involved in drug 
trafficking and trafficking human beings (THB) is a strategic decision for terrorist 
organizations insofar as the extra benefit obtained from the funds generated 
must outweigh increased law enforcement activity against the organization. 
One of the major disadvantages of occupying with criminal activities 
is that, “terrorists who choose criminal enterprises may become distracted from 
their perceived mission.”226 Terrorist organizations are inherently embedded in 
the population and derive their material and political support from the community 
they emerge from. Getting overly involved in criminal activities may cause 
community support to erode as criminal activities become harmful to the 
community.227 Resorting to criminal activities also makes the motives of terrorist 
groups questionable.228 The second major vulnerability created by resorting to 
criminal activities is that terrorist organizations become more visible to 
government authorities as they become heavily involved in criminal activities.229 
High visibility to authorities brings with it increased costs of operational security. 
Accordingly, terrorist organizations are forced to develop highly sophisticated 
structures in order to generate the same amount of funds. Thus, the costs of 
criminal activities increase. Moreover, other organized crime entities and terrorist 
organizations can rush in to increase their market shares and generate funds as 
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well. In time, groups that involve in excessive illegal activities may separate from 
the organization and the organization may lose command and control of the 
apparatus that specialize in illegal activities. Finally, the ringleaders of illegal 
fund-raising activities enjoy an increasing power base within terrorist 
organizations due to having access to large amounts of funds. These individuals 
may cause fractioning within the organization and a competition for leadership 
may weaken the terrorist organizations over the long term. 
b. PKK and Illegal Activities 
(1) Drug Trafficking. Even though accumulated drug usage 
data verify that Turkey is primarily a transit country, rather than a significant drug 
market, the majority of the drugs that pass through Turkey return as bullets and 
bombs used by the PKK.230 Various reports from different resources connect the 
PKK with drug trafficking. The PKK’s involvement in drug trafficking dates back to 
the early 1980s. From the very beginning, the PKK took part in the production 
and transportation sectors of drug trafficking.231 Turkey’s geographical position 
enables the utilization of its geography as a bridge between the “Golden 
Crescent,” the area made up of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, which where 
most of the drugs in the global market are produced, and Europe. Sources state 
that 80% of the drugs produced in this region are transferred to Europe through 
Turkey,232 and 94% of the Afghan-originated opiate seizures took place on an 
extended route through the Balkans.233 The same reports further demonstrate 
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the opportunity for the PKK to become involved in drug trafficking. Accordingly, it 
did not take long before the PKK discovered this opportunity and began utilizing it 
in order to generate funds for its terrorist activities. The U.S. State Department’s 
consecutive annual reports on “The International Narcotics Strategy” in 1996, 
1998, and 1999 emphasizes that the PKK uses drug trafficking to support its 
terrorist activities.234 The PKK also generated money by taxing other drug 
smugglers by simply providing them with security services235 and “extracting so-
called revolutionary taxes from narcotics traffickers and refiners in order to 
finance terrorist actions.”236 As the PKK enhanced its smuggling infrastructure in 
Turkey, it transferred “tons of morphine base, heroin, liquid hashish and other 
drug materials” to European countries utilizing the “Balkan Route.”237 A brief look 
at the journey of a kilogram of heroin would demonstrate the profitability of drug 
trafficking; one kilogram of heroin can be obtained from Afghanistan for 
approximately $1,000 to $2,000. The price of this product is between $6,000 and 
$8,000 in Turkey.  A wholesaler in Germany would pay $20,000 to $80,000 for it, 
and ultimately a kilogram of heroin would value somewhere around $75,000 to 
$225,000 on the streets of Western European countries.238 
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Figure 4.   Balkan Route (After UNODC, World Drug Report 2009, 180.) 
The PKK was also quick to understand that the real profit 
came from processing raw drug material rather than transporting it. Thus, 
beginning in the late 1980s, the PKK constructed drug-processing laboratories in 
Turkey.239 In the 13 years between 1986 and 1998, 50,000 tons of heroin, 
hashish, and morphine related to the PKK were seized.240 Authorities also state 
that, while it had access to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon during 1980s and early 
1990s, in addition to the drugs it processed in Turkey, the PKK produced 60 tons 
of heroin and hashish annually in the area.241 The establishment of the Kurdish 
diaspora in Europe and the PKK’s control over it provided the PKK with a 
significant boost in drug trafficking. Apart from other aspects, the PKK used 
Kurdish immigrants in the drug business, even forcing 10- to 15-year-old children 
to sell drugs.242 According to Interpol data, the PKK owned 80% of the European 
drug market with 178 organizations in 1992.243 Germany stated that 75% of the 
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drugs apprehended in the country in 1994 were related to Kurds living in 
Germany, while other sources estimated that some 60% to 80% of the European 
drug market was controlled by the PKK between 1992 and1996.244 
The turn of the century did not bring good news on this 
issue. Drug trafficking became even more important for the PKK because of its 
loss of state support in the late 1990s. Furthermore, the war in Iraq re-routed a 
significant amount of heroin traffic from Iran to Iraq due to decreasing law 
enforcement levels and the power vacuum in Iraq; the PKK benefitted from this 
change.245 Following the 9/11 attacks on the United States, countering the 
financing of terrorism became more important, and the European states 
strengthened their efforts in this area. Various law enforcement operations 
throughout Europe targeted the PKK. British security services arrested two PKK 
militants in a case related to PKK financing in 2002; the Netherlands raided a 
PKK camp in 2004, arresting 29 PKK militants, who admitted that they were 
training to participate in the PKK’s armed campaign against Turkey; in 2005 
Germany shut down several websites and news agencies that supported the 
PKK.246 In 2007, France arrested 13 people who were suspected of PKK 
financing and drug trafficking activities; simultaneous arrests also took place in 
Belgium, where most of the suspects were gradually released afterwards, and 
Germany.247 Nonetheless, these efforts had limited effects on the PKK. 
European sources state that in 2005, Turks controlled 80% of the European drug 
market.248 Even if it is unrealistic to assume that the PKK is completely 
responsible for this 80%, the PKK is known for taxing the income of other 
criminal organizations. While the PKK may not directly control 80% of the 
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European drug trade, it is possibly earning a share through so-called taxes from 
the part of the trade for which it is not directly responsible. 
In sum, the PKK utilized the geographical features of Iraq 
and Turkey to establish its drug trafficking infrastructure to the greatest possible 
extent. The PKK was involved in the production, transport, and sales phases of 
the illegal drug trade from the early 1980s to late 1990s. Additionally, the PKK 
taxed other criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking, and used the funds 
generated to support its terrorist actions. The PKK lost its state sponsorship in 
late 1990s; thus, other sources of income became more important to support the 
organization’s needs. On the other hand, the international environment became 
more sensitive to the need to counter terrorism funding after 9/11 with the efforts 
of the United States as an example. Nevertheless, the European Union countries’ 
crackdowns on the PKK’s drug trafficking structure are far from producing the 
desired outcomes. On one hand, Western Europe countries are reluctant to act 
decisively against the PKK’s drug trafficking activities. On the other, there is little, 
if any, control over the Golden Crescent countries’ drug production functions. 
Thus, without control over the main parameters that fuel drug trafficking, it seems 
there is little Turkey can do without international cooperation to disrupt funds 
flowing to the PKK via drug trafficking. 
(2) Trafficking Human Beings. The geographical position of 
Turkey plays a significant role in the THB issue as well. Turkey is an important 
transit country for illegal immigrants trying to gain access to European Union 
countries.249 The PKK utilizes human trafficking to such an extent that it is the 
PKK’s second most profitable illegal activity after drug trafficking.250 Beginning in 
1989, the PKK established passport counterfeiting groups to traffic refugees into 
Western Europe. Some sources argue that the PKK purposefully encouraged 
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immigration in order to capture European public opinion and manipulate that 
attention so as to reach its own goals.251 Between 1989 and 1992, the PKK was 
involved in trafficking Turkish citizens with Kurdish ethnicity into Europe and 
thereby manipulating the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The PKK helped Turkish Kurds 
only if they declared that they were facing deliberate ethnic discrimination from 
the Turkish government.252 After providing passage to Western Europe 
countries, the PKK managed to utilize these growing refugee and illegal 
immigrant population according to its own needs. This issue will be discussed in 
detail in the following sections. An overall examination of the issue reveals that 
the PKK also uses its drug trafficking routes to traffic human subjects from South 
Asia to Europe via Turkey.253 Interpol states that the PKK generates between 
€2,000 and €3,000 from each illegal immigrant, and Italian security officials 
accuse the PKK of smuggling some 9,000 refugees solely in 2001.254 In 2005, 
after dismantling a PKK-related human smuggling ring, Romanian officials stated 
that the PKK charged each illegal immigrant from €6,000 to €7,000 in exchange 
for safe passage to Western European countries.255 The same sources claim 
that the money generated through these operations is then sent to PKK camps in 
Iraq to support the PKK’s terrorist campaign.256 
(3) Other Illegal Activities. In addition to forging passports 
and other materials used to traffic illegal immigrants to Western Europe, 
according to Interpol data, the PKK was involved in counterfeiting government 
stamps and $100 banknotes in mid-1990s.257 Furthermore, the PKK smuggles 
contraband cigarettes with forged tax stamps and then sells them for retail 
                                            
251 Sehirli, Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures), 361. 
252 Sehirli, Separatist Terror Movements in Turkey (and the State's Counter Measures), 361. 
253 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate,” 909. 
254 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate,” 909. 
255 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate,” 909-910. 
256 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate,” 910. 
257 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate,” 912. 
 62
price.258 A lawsuit in 2002 indirectly “revealed that [between 1990 and 2002] the 
PKK units in northern Iraq were collecting tax on all cigarettes trafficked into 
Baghdad and the rest of Iraq” through the towns of Dohuk and Zakho, which 
were then under the control of Uday Hussein, the son of Saddam Hussein.259 
Other reports have added blood smuggling to the trafficking 
activities of the PKK. In 2005, Aksiyon, a weekly Turkish newsletter, reported that 
the PKK was collecting blood from southeastern areas of Turkey under its so-
called Kurdish Red Crescent organization, and smuggled this blood abroad to 
sell, pass tests on to generate an ethnic map and sell the acquired results to 
make money.260 
3. Legal Activities 
a. Advantages and Disadvantages of Legal Activities 
Terrorist organizations utilize legal activities, such as front 
companies and legal businesses, to generate funds. Most transnational terrorist 
organizations benefit from legal fund-raising activities. These legal businesses or 
front companies serve as money laundering operations, which help terrorist 
organizations to move funds generated by means of illegal activities into the legal 
commercial system. 
However, legal businesses can be seized because they are visible 
to the authorities. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies perform continuous 
surveillance to prevent direct support to terrorist organizations, and when there is 
clear evidence that a legal organization is providing funding for a terrorist 
organization, its funds are either frozen or confiscated by the government. The 
complexity involved in establishing and running a successful business is another 
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difficulty for terrorist organizations. Legal businesses require high levels of 
expertise and experience to run; this aspect of legal activities raises the bar and 
cost of entry to this market. The last, but not the least, important drawback to 
utilizing legal businesses for fund-raising is that these entities provide an entry 
point for the authorities. States can infiltrate agents into the terrorist 
organizations’ economic system through legal businesses and obtain a 
continuous flow of intelligence about the fund-raising activities of the terrorist 
organizations. 
b. PKK and Legal Activities 
(1) Affiliated Organizations. When it comes to legal activities 
as a source of terrorism financing, “according to Turkish authorities, the PKK has 
a vast network of 400 affiliated organizations in Europe—about half of which are 
in Germany—engaged in these activities.”261 One of the difficulties of designating 
a legal organization as an apparatus of a terrorist organization’s financing 
function is linking the legal organization’s money flow to the terrorist organization. 
As the effects of globalization made it easier to move money and materials 
across borders, national law enforcement agencies became helpless against the 
legal loopholes utilized by these legal companies. Nonetheless, the following 
list262 demonstrates the spectrum of the legal activities that the PKK is involved 
in: 
 Two news agencies 
 Four television stations 
 Thirteen radio stations 
 Ten newspapers 
 Nineteen periodicals 
 Three publishing houses 
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In-depth analysis and naming these organizations are 
beyond the scope of this analysis; however, this list demonstrates the wide 
spectrum that the PKK uses to raise the funds it uses to support its terrorist 
actions. It should also be noted that however small the income generated from 
these legal businesses, these companies mainly serve two other more important 
purposes for the PKK: propaganda (i.e., legal businesses disseminate the 
political message of the PKK and serve as the showcase of the PKK to the 
masses) and money laundering (i.e., legal businesses are invaluable money 
laundering assets for every group that generate funds from illicit means—it is this 
issue that is discussed next). 
(2) Money Laundering. The PKK’s need for money 
laundering is not great because the PKK, like many other terrorist organizations, 
uses its monetary resources to buy illegal goods and services. For instance, the 
PKK raises significant resources through drug trafficking and uses these 
resources to buy weapons and ammunition from illegal third parties, or to bribe 
officials to turn a blind eye to its cigarette smuggling activities. Thus, the need for 
clean money is relatively low compared to total income, insofar as the majority of 
expenses are incurred in illegal economic markets. The PKK has also directed 
some of its income to establish legal investments and corporations as a means of 
sustaining a steady income over the long term, thus supporting its existence.263 
Two important law enforcement operations reveal the size and the scope of the 
money laundering apparatus of the PKK. 
In September 18, 1996, the English, Belgian, German, and 
Luxembourg police forces launched Operation Sputnik in order to investigate the 
Med TV Broadcasting Company’s suspected money laundering activities as they 
related to the PKK. Authorities were able to link $11 million U.S. of Med TV’s 
assets to PKK drug trafficking and THB operations undertaken.264 Further  
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investigation revealed that “the PKK conducted its activities through fifteen 
different companies that laundered illicit money” including the so-called Kurdish 
Parliament in Exile.265 
In 2002, the Belgian and French police forces launched 
Operation Sputnik II to target the PKK’s money laundering activities. The 
investigation revealed a Paris-based company, which laundered money and 
forged documents.266 As the investigation matured, the authorities discovered 
that a company named Kurdish Foundation Trust transferred laundered money to 
the PKK.267 Other sources stated that Kurdish Foundation Trust was originated 
from the “Jersey Islands, known as an offshore haven for international money 
laundering.”268 Turkish authorities also name Greek Cyprus, also another 
international haven for money laundering, as one of the locations that the PKK 
utilizes for this purpose. 
Considering the scarcity of operations that target the PKK’s 
money laundering apparatus and the legal difficulties surrounding the money 
laundering issue as a whole, these two operations demonstrate the spectrum of 
PKK’s money laundering operations. They reveal that the PKK has a vast 
network of legal companies that are used for transferring assets and launder dirty 
money generated through illegal sources. It would not be too far-reaching to 
assert that the PKK has professionally set up its money laundering system 
utilizing the legal loopholes and black holes of the European money market. 
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4. Donations, Charity Organizations and International Diasporas 
a. Advantages and Disadvantages of Donations, Charity 
Organizations and International Diasporas 
Donations, charity organizations, wealthy individuals, and 
international diasporas that favor the cause of terrorist organizations also provide 
significant income for the terrorist organizations. Due to its nature, popular 
support can be as much witting as unwitting. For instance, terrorist organizations 
can easily generate funds from an unwitting public through aid money collected 
in mosques after Friday prayers, door-to-door sales of published material, and 
charity organizations working under pseudo-causes. Terrorist organizations, 
however, can also establish liaison offices and well-known charity organizations 
to raise funds. Donations and charities provide a relatively easy and low-cost way 
to generate funds. They are simple to establish and law enforcement agencies 
cannot interrupt them at will because they are legal. Geographical flexibility is 
another benefit of these assets; terrorist organizations do not need to spend the 
money obtained through donations and charities in the areas where they are 
generated. These entities help raise funds from individuals who fear public 
pressure by keeping the donors’ identities anonymous. International diasporas 
can help terrorist organizations in two ways. First, members can either directly 
donate money and labor to terrorist organizations or can help terrorist 
organizations in expanding their support bases. Second, powerful members of 
the diaspora, who have access to the political systems of the states they operate 
or hold significant political power, can lobby on behalf of the terrorist 
organization’s cause and provide political and/or funding support for the terrorist 
organization. 
Nevertheless, there is a limit to the funds that can be raised in this 
way because participation cannot be forced. The legal nature of these assets 
also leaves them open to scrutiny, and transparency regulations limit direct 
involvement in funding terrorist actions. In fact, when links between charities and 
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terrorist organizations are exposed, states can seize or freeze the charities’ 
assets. Moreover, the amount of funds generated is not steady and usually 
fluctuates depending on the political situation, economic circumstances, and 
public opinion of the targeted population. Also, donations and charity 
organizations that generate significant amounts of funds can easily be 
intercepted, tracked, and infiltrated by law enforcement agencies. Another 
downside is that if donations and charity organizations generate the majority of 
the funds for the terrorist organizations, it is possible that these can exercise 
significant power over terrorist organizations similar to the control exerted by 
state sponsors. Additionally, a natural order effect can be the emergence of 
different terrorist organizations that want to benefit from the same public domain 
resources. 
b. PKK and International Diaspora 
The Kurdish diaspora in Western Europe has provided political and 
material support to the PKK for a long time. On one hand, the PKK masterfully 
establishes its own diaspora (utilizing THB), while on the other hand it tries to 
muster more support for its existing diaspora (utilizing propaganda.) For instance, 
while discussing the THB issue this thesis pointed out the PKK’s utilization of 
trafficked illegal immigrants in order to raise funds. Here the study discusses how 
the PKK uses THB to establish a diaspora of its own. 
The PKK forcibly registers illegal immigrants with various front 
companies of its own as they are smuggled into Western European countries.269 
Sources point out that the importance of these memberships, as “being related to 
the Kurdish associations abroad is one of the most important conditions for a 
Kurd to become a refugee and the acceptance of his/her application.”270 After the 
illegal immigrants are delivered to their destination, the PKK’s front companies 
provide them with accommodation, food, and take care of the legal issues until 
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the refugees are able to find a job and provide their own financial support.271 
Ultimately, the refugees provide “membership fees” to these front companies that 
have helped them during the hardest part of their lives.272 Furthermore, the PKK 
has forced children to sell drugs, and has used them as nondeciphered agents in 
drug trafficking.273 
Aside from providing an important and stable source of income, 
Kurdish nongovernmental organizations have provided a strong power base for 
the PKK in Europe and enabled the PKK to be seen as the so-called political 
representative of the Turkish Kurds abroad.274 
5. Extortion 
a. Advantages and Disadvantages of Extortion 
Even though they use different techniques, both urban and rural 
insurgencies utilize extortion as a means of fund-raising. Extortion is the natural 
result of wielding power. Insurgencies tax the public under the name of 
“revolutionary taxes” in rural areas, and the name of the tax becomes “protection 
fees” in urban settings. Extortion is a quick and reliable way of generating funds. 
Terrorist organizations both undermine the legitimacy of the state and establish 
political control over the population at the same time by taxing the population. 
Extortion has many drawbacks if not handled carefully. First, 
extortion creates resistance from the population. As the amount and the 
frequency of material demands increase, so do the number of groups that 
oppose the terrorist organization within the subject population. Given enough 
time and the necessary conditions, there is a high probability that the population 
will appeal to the authorities or establish their own enforcement structure for 
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protection against extortion. Second, extortion alienates the population from the 
cause of the terrorist organization. Third, terrorist organizations expose 
themselves to the law enforcement apparatus of the state, which in turn can 
exploit this visibility to infiltrate the terrorist organization. Moreover, employing 
extortion as a fund-raising effort draws unwanted attention to the terrorist 
organization from third parties, and might possibly cause friction in other fields of 
operations. Finally, income from extortion is limited to the profits of the 
businesses being extorted. Consequently, terrorist organizations must consider 
wisely while employing the extortion strategy to generate funds, because too 
much of it can backfire and rapidly erode public support for the movement. 
b. PKK and Extortion 
Among other forms of fund raising, the PKK is known to use 
extortion as a way to generate funds. Through coercion, violence, or the threat of 
violence the PKK extorts members of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe who do not 
voluntarily donate to the terrorist organization.275 In 2005, the Belgian police 
arrested several suspects who were tied to the PKK’s financing activities. 
Authorities quickly found that “the suspects were collecting ‘tax’ from their fellow 
countrymen” to support the PKK.276 The “PKK also taxes ethnic Kurdish drug 
traffickers in Western Europe.”277 Other accounts of PKK extortion in Europe 
include a protection racket in Northern London where restaurants pay “insurance 
fees,” Turkish businessman of Kurdish origin and various other companies in 
Belgium that are extorted on a monthly basis, and similar extortion activities in 
North Rhineland, Westphalia, and Saxony in Germany.278 The PKK also resorts 
to extortion in order to generate funds in Turkey from Turkish Kurds who live in 
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the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey.279 Other sources state that the 
PKK extorts money from firms and contractors that are hired by the Turkish 
government for contracts, travel agencies that work in the eastern and 
southeastern regions of Turkey, local government offices through coercion and 
threat of violence, families who obey the law and conscript their children, and 
ethnic Kurdish businessmen and hotel owners. 
6. How Much Does the PKK Make? 
Up to this point this study has discussed the main sources of funding for 
terrorist organizations and has analyzed the PKK’s position within the terrorism 
financing spectrum. It now seeks to estimate the amount of income the PKK 
raises from each source. 
As noted earlier it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify the amount of 
resources that the PKK raises utilizing state sponsorship. Additionally, some 
aspects of state sponsorship, such as political support for the PKK’s cause and 
turning a blind eye to its activities cannot be translated into monetary figures. 
Figure 5 demonstrates the change in the PKK’s overall funding sources in 
accordance with the result of the analysis provided in this chapter. 
                                            
279 Roth and Sever, “The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate,” 910. 
 71
 
Figure 5.   Tentative Projection of Shifts in PKK’s Financing Sources 
The PKK terrorist organization has been benefiting from state sponsorship 
since its establishment. The era of first armed campaign funding, from 1978 to 
1998, is dominated with state sponsorship. Foreign states provided the required 
money, camps, weapons, training, bases and the infrastructure to generate more 
of these assets to the PKK. Political support from states that held various 
grievances with Turkey was immense. Accordingly, the PKK slowly but steadily 
established its own funding sources. As the PKK gained expertise in drug 
trafficking and trafficking human beings, the organization expanded its reach and 
scope of the illegal sources of funding. Through the early- to mid-1990s, the PKK 
managed to stay under the radar as it slowly established its infrastructure and 
Kurdish diaspora in Western Europe. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not 
affect the PKK’s funding such that the PKK’s funding structure was well-
established long before this event. In mid- to late-1990s both the legal and illegal 
funding infrastructure of the PKK had strong foundations and various states’ law 
enforcement agencies increasingly mentioned PKK’s name. 
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As demonstrated in Figure 5, the second era of the PKK’s funding is 
relatively independent compared to the first phase of the armed campaign. The 
PKK lost its state sponsorship as Syria expelled Abdullah Ocalan and no other 
country dared to provide a safe haven for the terrorist organization. Thus, the 
main income sources of the PKK have shifted from state sponsorship to self-
generated funds. Losing its state sponsors, the PKK was not able to generate as 
much funds as before (note that Figure 5 represents the percentage of income, 
not the amount.) Even though European countries cannot be classified as 
providing funds for the PKK anymore, their passive policy on eradicating PKK’s 
funding assets indirectly help PKK to raise funds freely. Accordingly, Western 
European countries’ reluctance to crack down the PKK’s funding apparatus and 
other activities within their borders is represented as the small state sponsorship 
area in Figure 5.  
One of the main handicaps of working on terrorism financing is the 
availability of certain figures. Terrorist organizations are illegal entities, and they 
operate covertly to the possible extent. Thus, it is nearly impossible to map the 
amount of income they generate and break it down to more detailed articles in 
order to study extensively. Not making the effort to do so, however, does not help 
either. Thus, this study compiles figures from various open source data to 
examine the estimated income of the PKK terrorist organization. The 
accumulated data are demonstrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.   Estimated Income of the PKK Terrorist Organization 
These results underscore the importance of drug trafficking and THB in 
PKK’s funding assets. These two assets, which comprise the majority of its illegal 
activities, are the backbone of the PKK’s funding efforts. The second most 
profitable asset is legal activities. Front companies, television stations, news 
agencies, radio stations, and publishing houses generate approximately a 
quarter of the PKK’s income. As discussed above, unlike other assets, these are 
completely visible to the authorities; the attribution problem, however, coupled 
with the reluctant law enforcement efforts of the European countries, shield these 
entities from decisive countermeasures. After Abdullah Ocalan’s capture, the 
PKK had difficulty generating resources from the Kurdish diaspora.280 
Nonetheless, the funds collected from sympathizers constitute approximately 
10% to 15% of total annual income. Finally, the income generated through 
extortion constitutes approximately the same percentage as generated by the 
Kurdish diaspora. 
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This section of the chapter examined different sources of income, with 
their advantages and disadvantages, available to all terrorist organizations. 
Furthermore, the study discussed the level of the PKK’s fund-raising activities 
utilizing these sources in detail. Finally, a picture of the funding sources and their 
importance in the overall funding activities of the PKK terrorist organization is 
analyzed. The remaining part of this chapter discusses the assisting factors 
whose level of existence significantly affects the amount of funds generated by 
the terrorist organizations. 
B. ASSISTING FACTORS 
Analysts can better designate counterterrorism financing (CTF) strategies 
if they are aware of the sources and the advantages that these sources provide 
for terrorist financing. Examining some of the major intervening variables that 
affect terrorism financing, however, can provide a better understanding of the 
subject, and increases the precision of the CTF strategies. This section of the 
chapter focuses on the two major intervening variables of terrorism financing: the 
effects of safe havens and the relationship between the terrorist financing and 
organized crime. 
1. Safe Havens 
Safe havens can be identified as geographic areas, infrastructure, and 
facilities where terrorists can raise funds through different types of financing 
activities; conduct training and indoctrination; develop logistics networks to 
enable travel, the movement of money, and the access to fraudulent documents 
and weapons; and safe areas where terrorist organizations can plan and launch 
operations.281 In order for a geographic area to become a safe haven for terrorist 
activity, it must posses certain attributes. First, geographical areas “that have 
rugged terrain to ensure the inaccessibility of local authorities, porous borders 
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allowing for the easy movement of people and equipment as well as natural 
geographical features that may serve as physical obstacles to conceal activities” 
can serve as suitable candidates for physical safe havens.282 The long shores 
and porous borders of Chile, the mountainous landscape of the Waziristan 
region, and the dense forests of Colombia are sound examples of geographical 
inaccessibility. 
The eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey, where the PKK’s terrorist 
activities are clustered, have a rugged and mountainous terrain, with average 
peaks of around 3,000 meters. The terrain comprising the proximity of the Iraq-
Turkey border is covered with steep mountains that allow little to no vehicular 
traffic except on the roads established in riverbeds. The mountain passes are 
closed by snow during the winter season, which makes ground operations 
impossible with temperatures as low as -30ºC. The rocky characteristics of the 
mountains and deep valleys hinder the effectiveness of air operations 
significantly, including observation and air strikes. The movement speed of 
dismounted units can be as low as 8 to 10 kilometers a day. Thus, it is nearly 
impossible to control this area completely. Both the Iraqi and Turkish sides of the 
border have the same characteristics, and neither government can fully exercise 
their authority outside population centers. Consequently, the northern regions of 
Iraq, where the PKK’s main and operational bases are located, and the 
southeastern region of Turkey, where the PKK’s terrorist activities are clustered, 
share the same geographical characteristics and infrastructure deficiencies in 
general. These attributes of the mentioned region make the area prone to being 
a geographical safe haven for the PKK terrorist organization. 
Another attribute of safe havens is weak governance, which can be 
defined as the inability of the state to provide security, law and order, and basic 
public services such as education, health, and infrastructure for the population; to 
establish and run institutions to provide and maintain domestic and international 
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legitimacy; and finally, to control an economic system in order to process internal 
and external revenues. The level of presence and absence of these conditions 
places the states along a spectrum ranging from collapsed to failed, failing, and 
sovereign states.283 Moreover, weak governance does not need to comprise the 
whole state for safe havens to emerge. Even sovereign states may have pockets 
of political instability where the state fails to exert its authority.284 
The PKK’s bases are located in the PUK- and KDP-controlled regions of 
KRG.285 After the 1991 Gulf Crisis, coalition forces, and especially the United 
States, denied the Iraqi central government the ability to exercise its authority in 
the region by forcing a no-fly zone above the 36th parallel.286 Thus, beginning in 
1992 the PUK and the KDP have actively controlled the region, filling the security 
and political vacuums in the absence of the central authority. After a skirmish 
between 1994 and 1997 over the revenue from the border trade in oil, the groups 
united their efforts and rose as a player both in domestic and international arena 
to some degree.287 Accordingly, the region has been controlled by 
nongovernmental armed groups for a long time, and these groups have neither 
the military power nor the political will to act against the PKK for the reasons 
discussed above. In sum, the political history and current political situation 
surrounding the region inherits the necessary weak governance characteristics 
for becoming a safe haven for the PKK. 
A final attribute of safe havens is “a history of corruption, both 
governmental and those conducted by criminal individuals, which can further 
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exacerbate the circumstances that facilitate terrorists’ activities.”288 Corruption 
boosts the illegal economy, demeans the legitimacy of the state and undermines 
its authority. As the scale of corruption increases, so does the scale of the 
shadow economy and creates significant opportunities for terrorist groups to 
generate funds. 
Drug trafficking, sale of counterfeit cigarettes, trafficking human beings, 
and smuggling both domestically and internationally constitutes the economy of 
the region.289 Local industries in the region are nearly nonexistent and the KDP’s 
and PUK’s “semi-institutionalized smuggling networks” with Iran and Turkey 
provide the only source of income for the region.290 The PKK generates 
significant amounts of funds taxing these informal trade routes that pass through 
its region.291 
In sum, safe havens provide significant opportunities for terrorist 
organizations to establish and run their infrastructure. Both the presence and 
level of these attributes designate the level of ungovernability of an area. 
Financing cannot be thought of as a separate function of terrorist organizations, 
so safe havens also provide favorable conditions for the financing infrastructure 
of these organizations. In the light of these conditions, the northern region of Iraq, 
where the PKK has its physical infrastructure, has been a geographical safe 
haven for more than two decades. The geography is inaccessible, there is a 
security and political vacuum in the region, and there has been no legal economy 
to speak of for nearly two decades. All of these attributes create a physical safe 
haven from which the PKK can run its operations, in addition to providing 
significant opportunities to generate funds for its terrorist activities. 
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2. The Relationship Between the Terrorist Organizations and 
Organized Crime 
Scholars increasingly examine the nexus between terrorist organizations 
in order to identify the impact of this relationship on terrorist financing. To put it 
briefly, organized crime can be described as a networked or hierarchical 
structure that systematically adopts as its ultimate objective criminal activities in 
pursuit of profit.292 Organized crime entities are profit-focused and employ 
violence in order to eliminate threats to their businesses, rival organizations, and 
increase their profit.293 Terrorist organizations, on the other hand, “can be 
understood as entities quintessentially political organizations with a commitment 
to large-scale political change and the use of violence to enable that change.”294 
Terrorist organizations are focused on political change and violence is a defining 
characteristic that differentiates terrorists from other political activists.295 Williams 
argue that the common denominator between organized crime and terrorist 
entities is generating funds, no matter their fundamental differences upon 
employing violence.296 Figure 7 demonstrates Williams’ modeling of relationships 
between organized crime and terrorist organizations. 
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Figure 7.   Possible Relationships and Transformations Between Terrorist 
Organizations and Criminal Enterprises (From Williams, “Terrorist 
Financing and Organized Crime,” 134) 
The most common relationship between the criminal enterprises and 
terrorist organizations is the appropriation of organized criminal activities by 
terrorist entities.297 The Provisional Ireland Republican Army (PIRA), Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hezbollah, 
Abu Sayyaf, The Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (GSPC), Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT), and the PKK are some of the transnational terrorist organizations 
that fit this template.298 While unlikely, cooperation between two entities and the 
transformation of one entity to other is also possible. 
Terrorist entities and criminal enterprises have different priorities and 
employ violence under different concepts. These groups can meet on common 
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Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate.” 
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platforms as terrorist organizations employ criminal activities more frequently. 
Forming alliances and strategic partnerships, however, is unlikely insofar as the 
gap between the visions of these groups is vast. 
The PKK’s involvement in organized crime is well established and 
examined thoroughly in this study. For instance, the PKK takes part in all phases 
of drug trafficking, from production to retail distribution.299 The PKK operates 
laboratories in Iraq and Turkey, using morphine base mostly obtained from 
Pakistan, and imports anhydride acid from Germany to produce heroin.300 The 
PKK has also established its own distribution network for selling the drugs 
produced on the street, where their value is highest.301 “Besides trafficking done 
by individual cells to support their operations, the PKK also ‘taxes’ ethnic Kurdish 
drug traffickers in Western Europe.”302 THB, smuggling, and extortion are other 
activities that cement the PKK’s appropriation of organized crime to generate 
funds. Furthermore, in a study designed to examine different types of criminal 
activities, a group of law enforcement experts created parameters to distinguish 
organized crime from other types of criminal activity. After the examination of the 
PKK’s criminal activities according to the eleven parameters established by the 
study, it turned out that the PKK has actively participated in nine of them.303 
Moreover, when evaluated according to the definitions of the U.N., the PKK is 
identified as both a transnational criminal organization and a terrorist group.304 
As much as the PKK’s involvement in organized crime is clear, it would be 
a far-reaching argument to assert that this involvement is turning the PKK into a 
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criminal organization.305 Far from keeping a low profile in order to avoid decisive 
government retaliation and focusing on profits, the PKK relaunched its armed 
campaign in 2004.306 Thus, the PKK can be identified as a “hybrid entity,” which 
can be described as a terrorist organization “stealing whole chapters out of the 
criminal playbook” to fund its terrorist activities.307 Unfortunately, Michael Braun, 
the Drug Enforcement Administration’s former chief of operations, identifies these 
hybrid entities as “the face of twenty-first century organized crime—and they are 
meaner and uglier than anything law enforcement or militaries have ever faced. 
They represent the most significant security challenge facing governments 
around the world.”308 The PKK incorporated the characteristics of organized 
crime into its structure so as to generate funds only years after being established, 
and its relation with organized crime turned it into a hybrid entity. Especially after 
losing its state sponsorship and beginning to finance its terrorist activities 
independently, the importance of its organized crime activities peaked. On the 
other hand, as various reports and studies concur, this embeddedness did not 
turn the PKK into a criminal group. 
In this part of the chapter, the study focused on the assisting factors that 
serve as a force multiplier for terrorism financing sources. First, the roles of 
geographical safe havens and the nexus among terrorist organizations and 
organized crime were defined. Next, the PKK was analyzed according to the 
attributes provided by these definitions to understand the role of these factors in 
PKK’s financing. The findings of the study show that the PKK’s funding efforts 
are boosted by existing physical safe havens, and the PKK successfully 
incorporates organized crime activities into its financing efforts. 
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The role of safe havens and the PKK’s physical infrastructure play an 
important role in the ongoing “armed propaganda” of PKK too. The next chapter 
will further analyze the role of geographical safe havens along with the 
embeddedness of the PKK terrorist organization in the population, utilizing GIS. 
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V. SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST 
INCIDENTS IN TURKEY: 2008–2010 
Developing policy and security options that disrupt terrorist organizations 
can only be achieved through a clear understanding of the governing dynamics 
of terrorist organizations. Considering the complex nature of variables that affect 
terrorist and insurgent movements, countering these threats requires an in-depth 
analysis in multiple disciplines. 
Futrell and Simi’s work highlights the effects of locality on social 
movements.309 They argue that both indigenous and transmovement free spaces 
create opportunities for movements to recruit members and sustain collective 
identity.310 Likewise, terrorist organizations can benefit from available free 
spaces to support their activities both materially and politically. Temporal and 
spatial analyses of terrorist incidents in a given region can provide significant 
understanding of terrorist organizations’ movements utilizing already existing 
data. GIS permits a better interpretation of the available data and makes 
statistical analyses more understandable, as GIS provides a common plane on 
which quantitative and qualitative analyses can merge. This chapter utilizes 
spatial and temporal statistical and cluster analysis techniques to examine 
patterns of terrorist incidents. These techniques enable a better understanding of 
terrorist incidents by adding a spatial dimension and enabling various data 
processing techniques to be used with current statistical processes. 
This chapter analyzes the PKK’s activities in Turkey from July 2008 to 
March 2010. It focuses on the spatial and temporal dispersion of PKK-based 
terrorist incidents in Turkey within this time span, and on observation of the 
geographical and temporal patterns of these terrorist incidents. The primary 
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questions it addresses are as: (1) Do terrorist incidents form a statistically 
meaningful distribution over time and space? (2) Can clustered terrorist incidents 
be identified? (3) Do terrorist attacks follow a distinguishable temporal pattern? 
Through these questions, the study aims to reach an understanding of the 
physical infrastructure of the PKK’s armed activities in Turkey, whether they are 
based in geographical safe havens in Iraq’s KRG region, or if the PKK is 
embedded in the population to a degree that supports its independent armed 
activities within Turkey. Finally, temporal analysis of these incidents will examine 
the force-on-force counterterrorism capabilities of the Turkish Armed Forces.  
The lack of open-source data and different incident types has an impact on the 
precision of the following analysis, but the detail level of the data is precise 
enough to obtain reliable outcomes in accordance with the scale of the study. 
A. A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF EXISTING TECHNIQUES 
Geographical research of terrorist incidents is focused on the chronology 
of terrorist events and activities of individual terrorist organizations in a qualitative 
nature.311 Nonspatial statistics analyses,312 hot-spot analyses at the regional or 
global level,313 and the identification of the regional origins of terrorist attacks 
contribute little to address the country-level analyses of terror hot spots.314 A 
different study, upon which this thesis is based, analyzes terrorist incidents at the 
country level and demonstrates that with corresponding intelligence assets and 
better quality data, the spatial and temporal dispersion of terrorist incidents can 
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be analyzed in order to achieve insightful outcomes.315 Consequently, this 
chapter examines the understudied area of spatial and temporal dispersion of 
terrorist incidents at the country level so as to gain insight into terrorist goals, 
activity spaces, and behavior patterns. 
The majority of crime analysis techniques that are used by police forces 
around the world can also be utilized in analyzing terrorist incidents. One of the 
similarities between crime and terrorist activities is their nature. Even though they 
serve different ends, terrorist incidents are committed in the same way that 
crimes are. Another similarity is nonrandom target selection. Criminals and 
terrorists alike choose their targets methodically.316 Finally, the purpose of the 
techniques used to detect spatial and temporal patterns of crimes and terrorist 
incidents is similar: both aim to identify incident patterns and to evaluate the 
pattern characteristics to generate possible reasoning.317 
This study utilizes the same spatial autocorrelation, hot-spot analyses and 
cluster detection methods employed in crime mapping and analyses techniques. 
When working with GIS, clustering should be examined spatially and temporally 
to precisely determine the relationship between incidents.318 With this principal in 
mind, this study first examines the spatial clustering of the incidents, and then 
moves on to analyze their temporal characteristics. Finally, the results of both 
analyses are discussed so as to obtain integrated results with higher explanatory 
value. 
Multi-disciplinary approaches underline the difficulties of developing a 
working knowledge of different disciplines at the same time. In an effort to relieve 
                                            
315 Seibeneck, Laura K., Richard M. Medina, Ikuho Yamada, and George F. Hepner, “Spatial 
and Temporal Analyses of Terrorist Incidents in Iraq, 2004–2006,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 
32, no. 7 (2009): 591–610. 
316  Seibeneck et al., “Spatial and Temporal Analyses of Terrorist Incidents in Iraq, 2004-
2006,” 593. 
317 Getis, Arthur and J. K. Ord, “The Analysis of Spatial Association by use of Distance 
Statistics,” Geographical Analysis, 24, no. 3 (1992): 189–206. 
318 Seibeneck et al., “Spatial and Temporal Analyses of Terrorist Incidents in Iraq, 2004–
2006,” 594. 
 86
the reader of this burden, the chapter begins with an explanation of the spatial 
and temporal analysis techniques used in this chapter before presenting the 
actual analyses. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
One method used in this research is spatial autocorrelation. Positive 
spatial autocorrelation highlights geographical areas surrounded by similar rates 
of incidents, whereas negative spatial autocorrelation indicates areas that have 
experienced higher rates of incidents in comparison to surrounding areas.  
Incidents of the same type are likely to be clustered in close proximity to each 
other, either because of the properties of the target, or the structure of the 
terrorist organization. Thus, spatial autocorrelation values provide some insight 
into the occurrence of clustering. 
Whereas spatial autocorrelation analysis helps in determining whether the 
data are clustered, hot-spot analyses identify the locations and size of these 
clusters.319 When dealing with hot-spots, it is important to take temporal change 
into account because over time hot-spots can change size, shape, and 
location.320 As Seibeneck argues, 
Tracking hot spots temporally can provide information on the spatial 
diffusion of crime. Insights into the reasons for the crimes may be 
found by researching these crime characteristics of local regions…. 
When applied to terrorist incident data, this technique is useful in 
the identification of terrorist hot spots, as well as in determining 
emergent and evolution patterns of hot spots over time.321 
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Temporal clustering of incidents is a valuable means of analyzing 
crime.322 While spatial clustering analysis of data focuses on the location of 
incidents, temporal clustering analysis focuses on the time clusters of incidents. 
Time analysis can explain patterns of incidents and add a significant amount of 
clarity to the interpretation of spatial clustering. This research employs the spatial 
and temporal analyses while considering these characteristics. 
This study utilizes Getis-Ord’s Gi and Moran’s I tests to analyze the 
dataset of terrorist incidents. These algorithms are powerful techniques that can 
provide high precision outputs for interpreting the relations within geographical 
datasets. Getis-Ord’s Gi and Moran’s I tests are used to detect areas with a high 
or low count of terrorist incidents. 
Getis-Ord’s Gi analysis identifies hot-spots where incidents cluster in a 
given time period. Hot-spots are designated as areas in which the existence of 
incidents is not coincidental and where the incidents originate from a specific 
cause. For this study, higher Gi values indicate areas that experience more 
terrorist incidents than others, within a region. 
On the other hand, Moran’s I analysis identifies the spatial autocorrelation 
of incidents. As discussed above, positive values indicate areas that are 
surrounded by areas with a similar number of incidents, where negative values 
indicate areas with a higher number of incidents than surrounding areas. For 
instance, consider a province that is experiencing high numbers of terrorist 
incidents. If the neighboring provinces also experience high counts of terrorist 
incidents, the positive I value of the selected province will be higher. However, if 
the neighboring provinces experience low numbers of terrorist incidents, the 
selected province is assigned a negative I value. Thus, the proximity of events is 
significant to spatial analyses, as opposed to temporal and chronological 
analyses. 
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In sum, both hot spot and spatial autocorrelation analyses provide 
invaluable insight by utilizing the geographical dispersion of incidents, if 
interpreted correctly. GIS provides a plethora of tools for analysts to use in 
interpreting the geographical and temporal dimension of various incidents. While 
the available information on the terrorist incidents makes it tempting to conduct 
multiple analyses, this study opts for a parsimonious framework, as outlined in 
the following section, in an effort to focus on the main research questions of this 
study. 
C. DATA AND EXPLANATORY VALUE OF ANALYSES 
1. Dataset Preparation 
The data used in this research are accessible from the official website of 
the Turkish General Staff.323 The data used in the study include the date of the 
incident, location (province and sub-district), type of incident, number of dead, 
number of wounded, and a description of the event. Another attribute designating 
the distance of the provinces from the Iraq border is also incorporated into the 
data. The latitude and longitude of provinces and sub-districts are obtained from 
open-source gazetteer files. Finally, the resulting dataset is divided into four-
month intervals before running Getis-Ord’s hot-spot analyses and Moran’s I 
analyses to identify the spatial autocorrelations and the hot-spots in the dataset. 
The geographical detail level of the data and the scale level of the 
research force a smaller scale hot spot analysis; however, this should not be 
considered as a shortcoming, since the purpose of this research is to examine 
country-level terrorist incidents. Sub-district level research would have yielded 
similar results, as the geographical scale of the study would have rendered the 
accuracy of distance meaningless. A more detailed study on a larger 
geographical scale, however, definitely needs sub-district level analyses. 
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2. Proximity to Safe Havens 
Using spatial clustering analyses, this study also aims to test the effects of 
physical distance to Iraqi border on the level of terrorist incident counts. One 
hypothesis argues that PKK militants are more active near the Iraqi border, 
where their main bases and camps are located. The camps provide logistical 
support, and the international border helps terrorists evade pursuit by security 
forces. Therefore, to examine the importance of external support and protection 
that the political geography provides, a “Border Effect” variable is also analyzed 
in this study. It was generated with the following equation: 
Border Effect = C X (1/D) 
Where “C” represents the count of events over a specific time period for a 
province, and “D” is the distance from the province to the Iraqi border. The 
inverse of the distance to the border is used in order to better capture the impact 
of incidents that take place closer to the border. If the inverse of the distance is 
not used, then a relatively small number of remote incidents can distort both the 
hot spot and spatial autocorrelation values calculated for “Border Effect” variable. 
Hot-spot analyses and geographical autocorrelation tests for the “Border 
Effect” shed light on the infrastructure and the effectiveness of the PKK’s armed 
activities in Turkey. For instance, hot spots designated with the “Border Effect” 
variable in neighboring provinces that are in close proximity to the border indicate 
that militants are tied logistically to their camps beyond the border. Ultimately, hot 
spots around the border area can be interpreted as the PKK’s inability to operate 
without the active support of the population. Finally, if a province is not 
designated as a hot spot with incident count analysis and identified as a hot spot 
for distance analyses, this means that the terrorist incidents in that province are 
supported significantly from beyond the border camps. 
Autocorrelation z values indicate the incident relationship between 
neighboring provinces. This study looks for high negative z values near the 
border area because such values indicate outliers (i.e., provinces surrounded 
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with unlike incident values). Provinces with high negative z values calculated for 
the “Border Effect” near the border area represent a geographical distinction that 
is dependent to the distance from the border. When compared with Moran’s I test 
for incident counts, the z value of “Border Effect” variable displays the effect of 
distance to the Iraqi border. Some provinces with a high level of clustering will 
not be considered outliers. In that situation, the clustering for outlier provinces 
proves to be highly correlated with their distance to the Iraqi border. 
3. Temporal Pattern Analyses 
For the purposes of temporal pattern analyses, the dataset is divided into 
time periods that are similar to the spatial analyses dataset. However, incidents 
are classified according to their types. Terrorists seized and surrendered, depots 
and weapon caches found by security forces, and extortion of resources from 
civilians are counted as successes for counterterrorist forces. All of these events 
indicate information superiority, the terrorists’ loss of faith in the cause, and the 
lack of infrastructure to support armed activities independently. These indicators 
point to a decline in the power of the terrorist organization. Accordingly, these 
types of events demonstrate the impact of counterterrorism efforts on the 
structure of the terrorist organization. This part of the study draws on an aspect 
of counterinsurgency theory that argues that the success of a counterinsurgent 
effort should not be measured in terms of the number of insurgents 
incapacitated, but rather in terms of the damage inflicted on the terrorist 
organization’s infrastructure.324 Accordingly, incidents that are not classified as 
successful counterinsurgency incidents, such as clashes between terrorists and 
security forces, regardless of initiator or outcomes; IED attacks, both successful 
and unsuccessful; and any interaction with civilians other than extortion of 
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resources, such as kidnapping or killing, are considered to be successful terrorist 
incidents. The logic behind this classification is that these incidents would not 
have taken place if the PKK were not present and capable of undertaking armed 
terrorist activities. 
The classification of the data has a significant effect on the outcome of the 
temporal analysis. The results of temporal analyses can vary widely, according to 
the incident types designated as successful terrorist activity or as successful 
counterterrorism efforts. Nonetheless, this study makes an effort to examine the 
temporal patterns of terrorist activity and the effectiveness of the security forces’ 
counterterrorist strategy on a strategic level. Detailing the variables in order to 
obtain tactical level success over time is beyond the scope of this research. 
D. RESULTS 
1. Spatial Clustering Analyses 
Both Anselin and Moran’s I and Getis-Ord’s Gi tests are run twice for each 
subset of the dataset. One set of the tests is run for incident counts, and the 
other set is run for the dataset created using the “Border Effect” variable. Table 2 
summarizes the results of Gi and I tests. In an effort to determine whether 
particular results are statistically significant and to normalize the test results 
among data groups, z scores are used instead of Gi and I values. The hot-spot 
and clustering analyses outcomes are evaluated in accordance with the normal 
distribution z values, where |z| ≥ 1,96 represents a p-value < 0,05, which 
indicates that there is a greater than a 95% chance that the observed scores 
have not occurred by chance. 
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Table 2.   z Score Values for Clustering Analyses 
a. Spatial Clustering Analyses for 2008 
The Gi scores run for 2008 incidents that took place between 
August and December identify Sirnak, Hakkari, Bitlis, and Van as hot spots. 
These provinces are shown in Figure 8. The Moran’s I test, run for the same 
period, indicate that Sirnak, Hakkari, Siirt, Van, and three more cities 
experienced significant positive spatial autocorrelation. Taken together, the Gi 
and I scores, along with Figure 8, suggest that the incidents in these provinces 
were highly related to each other and that the count of events produced a 
geographical zone of hot spots, indicating a nonrandom pattern of incidents. 
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Figure 8.   Hot Spots Identified by Getis-Ord Gi Analyses 
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The results for the “Border Effect” variable also identified Sirnak, 
Hakkari, Siirt, Bitlis, and Van as hot spots. Moran’s I test, however, indicate that 
Sirnak experienced negative spatial autocorrelation. The results of Gi and I tests 
indicate that the incidents that took place in Sirnak were highly correlated to its 
distance to the Iraq border, whereas cities surrounding Sirnak were relatively less 
affected in relation with their distance to Iraq border in terms of terrorist incidents 
experienced. 
b. Spatial Clustering Analyses for 2009 
The hot-spot tests from January 2009 to April 2009 reveal the 
following results: Sirnak, Siirt, Bitlis, Bingol and six additional cities as hot spots. 
According to Moran’s I cluster analysis, Sirnak, Diyarbakir, Bingol, Mardin, and 
two additional provinces experienced spatial autocorrelation, which indicates that 
they were surrounded by provinces that experienced a similar number of events. 
These results suggest there is a significant increase in the terrorist incidents that 
are spatially coherent and follow a pattern. When compared with the previous 
time period, the number of hot spots doubled, while the number of cities 
experiencing spatial autocorrelation was almost the same, except for the fact that 
the spatial weight of clustering expanded slightly to the western part of the 
country, as shown in Figure 8. 
From May 2009 to August 2009, Hakkari, Sirnak, Van, Siirt, and 
Bitlis were identified as hot spots, which are hot spots throughout the time period 
of this study. Furthermore, Hakkari, Van, and Sirnak experienced clustering 
according to autocorrelation analyses. One interpretation of this result is that Siirt 
and Bitlis were hot spots because of the high number of incidents that their 
neighboring provinces experienced. On the other hand, Hakkari, Van, and Bitlis 
remained hot spots due to nonrandom spatial incidents they suffered. 
Sirnak, Hakkari, Siirt, Bitlis, and Van experienced above-average 
levels of incidents relative to their distance to the Iraqi border. Moreover, Sirnak 
was the only province that experienced strong negative spatial autocorrelation. 
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Similar to the previous periods, Sirnak was surrounded by provinces that were 
not affected by their distance to the Iraqi border as much as Sirnak was. 
From September 2009 to December 2009 the hot spots remained 
the same, with slight differences in z values.  As in the previous time period, 
Sirnak, Siirt, Hakkari, Bitlis, and Van remained hot spots as shown, and 
according to the Moran’s I statistic, they also experienced spatial autocorrelation. 
For this time period, the results of both analyses matched perfectly as seen in 
Table 2, which indicates the nonrandom spatial relationship between the hot 
spots. 
Gi tests for the “Border Effect” variable identified Hakkari, Sirnak, 
and Van as hot spots, but Anselin and Moran’s I test does not detect any notable 
spatial autocorrelation among the provinces. This result indicates that while these 
provinces were hot spots in relation to their distance to the border, there is little 
sign of a pattern for this phenomenon within them. 
c. Spatial Clustering Analyses for 2010 
Before discussing the results of clustering tests for the 2010 
dataset, it must be noted that, unlike other datasets, which consist of four months 
of data each, there are only two months of data available for the 2010 dataset. 
As the number of incidents in a dataset decrease, there is a significant chance 
that the Gi and I analyses will not produce consistent outcomes for the “Border 
Effect” variable, due to the geographical scale of the study. Therefore, to prevent 
inconsistent results related to the small-scale variance in the 2010 dataset, when 
conducting Getis-Ord‘s Gi and Moran’s I analyses, the “Border Effect” variable 
was multiplied by ten.  Thus, every incident in the 2010 dataset is ten times more 
sensitive to the incident’s proximity to Iraqi border. This multiplier was derived by 
comparing the data from other periods and running multiple tests for consistency 




multiplier is applied to entire 2010 dataset, preventing subjective outcomes 
between provinces. Hot-spot clustering analyses were conducted without any 
modification to the dataset. 
The dataset for January and February 2010 hot-spot analyses of 
incident counts reveals that Sirnak, Siirt, Mardin, Bitlis and two additional 
provinces were hot spots. Unlike the preceding period, Mardin, Batman, and 
Diyarbakir were found to have a higher number of incidents than average. Spatial 
autocorrelation tests for 2010 time period also revealed a positive spatial 
relationship between Mardin, Diyarbakir, Sirnak, Siirt, and their surrounding 
provinces. Notably, Mardin’s z score is the third-highest in the research. On the 
other hand, Bitlis’s situation can be interpreted as a spillover effect from the high 
incident count of its neighbors. Like hot-spot analyses for the same time period, 
as shown in Figure 8, the clustering analyses confirmed a slight shift of clustering 
to the western part of the country. 
The Gi and I tests using the “Border Effect” variable indicate that 
Sirnak, Siirt, and Bitlis were hot spots and that Sirnak and Siirt experienced 
significant negative spatial autocorrelation. Similar to the results from previous 
periods, these results suggest that Sirnak and Siirt were more significantly 
affected by their distance to the Iraqi border than were other provinces that 
suffered similar or greater numbers of incidents. 
2. Temporal Analyses 
For the purposes of temporal analyses, unlike spatial analyses, the 
dataset is not divided into time periods. In order to obtain a comparable outcome, 
however, the data are categorized into two subsets as explained in the Data 
Preparation section. One of these subsets represents terrorist incidents. Clashes, 
regardless of which side initiated them or their outcome, were considered to be 
terrorist incidents. IED incidents and any incident related to civilians, except 
extortion of resources by the PKK militants, were also considered terrorist 
events. The logic of this classification is that none of these types of incidents 
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would have occurred if it were not for the PKK. Therefore, the aforementioned 
types of incidents are counted as terrorist incidents. On the other hand, counts of 
terrorists who have surrendered, depots and weapons caches found, and 
terrorists seized by security forces are counted toward successful 
counterterrorism efforts. These incidents demonstrate the impact of 
counterterrorist efforts on the structure of the terrorist organization. The results of 
the temporal comparison are shown in Figures 9 and 10. 
 
Figure 9.   Security Forces Efforts Compared to Terrorist Incidents Intensity 
The temporal analyses of terrorist and security forces incidents are clearly 
correlated, although they are more correlated beginning in 2009 when the 
security forces’ counterterrorist efforts increased. It should also be noted that 
terrorist incidents declined sharply from 2008 to 2009. Had more data been 
available, monthly matched comparison of temporal analyses for consecutive 
years would have revealed a better understanding of the trajectory and efficiency 
of counterterrorist efforts. 
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Figure 10.   Temporal Intensity of Terrorist Incidents and  
Counterterrorism Efforts 
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E. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The spatial distributions of incident clusters identified by hot-spot analyses 
were concentrated in the southeastern region of Turkey. Moreover, the tests run 
to examine the effects of the provinces’ distance to the Iraqi border also identified 
hot spots in the same region of the country. Thus, the results for both incident 
counts and proximity to the Iraqi border match, with high spatial autocorrelation 
values. The results also lend support to the argument that the distance of the 
provinces to the Iraqi border has a significant positive effect on the number of 
terrorist incidents. Put simply, provinces closer to the Iraqi border experienced 
more terrorist incidents. Test results also support the hypothesis that the PKK 
does not have a strong infrastructure within Turkey, such that it supports its 
terrorist activities from its bases located in northern regions of Iraq. When 
examined, the dataset reveals that some provinces that are not in close proximity 
to the Iraqi border also experienced high counts of terrorist incidents. The spatial 
clustering analyses, however, did not identify these provinces as hot spots. This 
suggests that the PKK lacks the infrastructure and logistical support to sustain its 
terrorist activities in these provinces and that its activities are marginal in these 
regions. A second-order inference would be that the PKK lacks the adequate 
embeddedness within the population to support and sustain its terrorist activities 
as the distance to its safe havens in Iraq increases. 
Temporal analyses as shown in Figures 9 and 10 indicate that security 
forces can adapt to changes in the intensity of terrorist incidents in a timely 
manner. It should be noted that clashes were considered to be terrorist incidents 
regardless of the initiator. Moreover, IED incidents were not classified as either 
defused or detonated. IED incidents were also considered terrorist incidents. 
IEDs and clashes constituted 45% of the overall incidents. As shown in Figure 
10, the impact of counterterrorist incidents rose during the winter period, where 
the intensity of terrorist incidents peaks between mid-spring and mid-fall. 
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There are several explanations for this pattern. One of them is the effect of 
the rugged terrain of Turkey’s southeastern regions. While steep mountains 
provide cover for terrorist groups, they also make it impossible to operate during 
harsh winter conditions. With a strong infrastructure the PKK would divert its 
activities from rural areas to cities where climate changes would not affect the 
militants. However, the earlier spatial analyses indicate that the PKK’s support 
structure is not strong enough to sustain its activities without support from its 
bases in Iraq. When the mountain passes are blocked by snow and militants lack 
support from safe havens, they keep a low profile and try to survive the winter 
with minimal losses. Temporal analysis indicates that the level of incidents 
diminished when compared to previous years. Examining more data 
encompassing a larger time span would provide better evidence for this 
argument, yet there is a significant decline in the intensity of terrorist attacks 
through the observed time period. 
A third inference can be that the level of terrorist movement is at the level 
of strategic defense. Figure 10 shows that security forces can easily counter the 
intensity of terrorist incidents without significant time delays and can adapt to the 
pace of ongoing activities. Additionally, when examined over time, there is an 
observable decline in the intensity of terrorist activities, indicating that security 
forces appear to have been successful in disrupting the PKK’s physical structure. 
The research could be detailed even further with more precise incident 
location data. This would allow the analyses of different patterns on a larger 
geographical scale. When combined with geographic information on rural 
population concentration and terrain analyses, more detailed clustering patterns 
can be obtained. Moreover, incidents can be classified according to their types 
and intensity. Hot-spot analyses of different types of incidents can help to 
determine changes in the tactics used by the PKK. Furthermore, using spatial 
analyses to examine the change in the tactics employed can provide a metric for 
the success of different strategies employed by security forces. If a real-time data 
feed were available, emerging hot spots could be identified with spatial clustering 
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tests and counterterrorism efforts could be directed to emerging hot spots in 
order to prevent an increase in the influence zone of the terrorist incidents. 
Finally, another way to obtain more precise evaluations would be to acquire more 
temporal data to designate the trajectory of terrorist incidents over time. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The study successfully answers the research questions set for terrorist 
incident analysis. The results indicate a significant level of spatial and temporal 
correlation in terrorist incidents. According to the results of spatial clustering 
analyses, some provinces experienced above-average levels of terrorist 
incidents. Furthermore, temporal analysis discovered a correlation between 
terrorist incidents and the Turkish government’s counterterrorism efforts, 
shedding light on the success level of the counterterrorism strategy employed. 
The results are both statistically significant and reveal much about the patterns of 
terrorist activities, ranging from the state of counterterrorist efforts to logistic 
support structure of the PKK terrorist organization. 
Initially, the study set out to find a means of disrupting the structure that 
provides resources to the PKK. The hypothesis tested with the help of GIS and 
inferences from the results of the analyses in this chapter reveals that: 
1. Proximity to the PKK’s safe havens affects the number of 
experienced terrorist incidents, 
2. The PKK lacks the logistical infrastructure to sustain armed 
activities within Turkey independent from logistical support provided 
by the geographical safe havens, 
3. The PKK is not embedded in the population to the level where it 
can sustain its armed activities through logistical support provided 
from the population, 
4. The PKK lacks the infrastructure to conduct armed campaign in 
urban areas. 
In sum, this chapter concludes that efforts designed to disrupt the physical 
infrastructure of the PKK’s armed activities in Turkey should look beyond the 
Iraqi border where the geographical safe havens of the PKK are located. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. DESIGNATING THE PROBLEM AREAS 
The main objective of this study was to identify the key components of 
terrorist organizations, whose absence or disruption would affect a terrorist 
organization as a whole. Deriving a conceptual roadmap from contemporary 
social movement theory, the research focused on analyzing the resources 
required to sustain the PKK’s terrorist activities. Its main argument was that 
targeting the resource generation and organizational structure of the PKK can 
lead to an overall disruption to the PKK’s network, ultimately diminishing its 
terrorist activities and creating greater opportunities to demobilize and reintegrate 
its members back into the community. 
The study thoroughly analyzed the PKK’s funding resources and 
organizational structure. Table 3 shows the designated problem areas in 
accordance with the analyses conducted in this study. 
 
Table 3.   Problem Areas and Their Domains 
As a result of the conducted analyses, safe havens, illegal activities, legal 
activities, the international diaspora of PKK members, and funds generated 
through extortion were designated as principal problem areas. Other means of 
support, such as state sponsorship, are not as essential as they once were to the 
PKK’s financing or organizational structure. The areas listed above constitute the 
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backbone of the PKK’s funding and material resources; they also provide a 
disruption-free infrastructure for a sustained armed campaign within Turkey’s 
borders. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following policy recommendations address the identified problem 
areas to the greatest possible extent and are focused on their characteristics and 
attributes. While the second-order effects of these policies on domestic and 
international audiences cannot be completely anticipated, necessary adjustments 
should be considered when feedback from these communities becomes available 
in order to mitigate second-order effects. Furthermore, some of these options 
require preexisting alliances, strong political support from regional and/or global 
power sources and timely actions to successfully implement the policies. Letting 
similar technical and political considerations of the application phase aside, the 
study offers the following policy recommendations for the problem areas 
designated in Table 3: 
1. Mobilize Multinational Organizations and Promote Regional 
Partnerships 
Empowering multinational organizations like the United Nations (UN) to 
force member states to comply with CTF regulations is one of the most effective 
ways of countering the PKK’s legal and illegal activities. The G-8’s Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) have all made significant progress regarding CTF issues in the last 
decade. Furthermore, the European Counter Terrorism Group (a body composed 
of the 25 EU member states, Norway, and Switzerland) can investigate the 
PKK’s illegal fundraising activities.325 Likewise, the United Nations Counter-
Terrorism Committee, which was specifically established to monitor and prevent 
                                            
325 Phillips, David L. and National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Disarming, 
Demobilizing, and Reintegrating the Kurdistan Worker's Party, New York, N.Y.: National 
Committee on American Foreign Policy, 2007, 13. 
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terrorism financing activities, can muster the support of the member states 
against the PKK’s legal fundraising efforts through front companies within their 
borders.326 The cooperation of states in CTF policies must be further encouraged 
through the above-mentioned international institutions and others that regulate 
the money flow of the global economy, remembering that some international 
organizations might prove more useful than others. For this reason, the Turkish 
government should primarily collaborate and engage with the most promising 
international organizations. 
The Turkish government should also promote regional partnerships that 
will prevent the PKK from generating resources and that will deny them safe 
havens. Turkey should work constructively with neighboring countries such as 
Iran, Syria, Iraq, Greece, and other stakeholders, as well as with most Western 
European countries in order to create initiatives where both sides can benefit 
from the eradication of the PKK’s terrorist activities. 
Most importantly, Turkey should seek to coordinate its efforts with other 
power bases, primarily with the Government of Iraq (GOI), as well as with other 
local organizations, such as the KRG, PUK, and KDP (to some degree) in order 
to establish border control and impact PKK logistics within the KRG region. On 
the contrary, exercising political power over the PUK, KDP, KRG, or GOI and 
operating with a large military footprint (e.g., establishing a military bumper zone 
within Iraqi territory) would backfire in the long term and provide more material 
and political support to the PKK. Rather than imposing its will on the GOI, Turkey 
should cooperate with it. 
2. Establish and Promote Intelligence Sharing Efforts 
The PKK financing mechanism benefits significantly from the effects of 
globalization. The PKK uses organized criminal activities to generate funds on a 
global scale. In contrast, the international state system is still struggling to 
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transform its functions, such as judicial differences, law enforcement regulations 
and differences in the economical systems to the effects of globalism. Ironically, 
the PKK generates the majority of its funds within the most developed economies 
in the world. Effective intelligence sharing, however, can easily turn the tide 
against the PKK’s financing apparatus. 
Promoting intelligence-sharing can help states fight terrorist financing 
more effectively. The legitimacy of the state system does not allow one country’s 
law enforcement efforts to take place within another country’s borders. 
Nonetheless, there are well-established international structures that can be 
utilized to address this problem. Interpol is one of a number of organizations that 
promote intelligence-sharing and law enforcement on a global scale. Other 
multinational organizations such as the U.N. and NATO have their own structures 
for exchanging information among their members. Accordingly, Turkey should 
promote intelligence-sharing capabilities within the multinational organizations of 
which it is currently a member. 
Furthermore, Turkey should invest in mutual partnerships and special 
initiatives on a state-by-state basis in order to improve its intelligence-sharing 
capabilities. These partnerships should focus on sharing information in order to 
disrupt the PKK’s funding and operational structure. Turkey has already 
established such a relationship with the GOI through a Counter-Terrorism 
Agreement327 and a mechanism is in place with the United States that facilitates 
sharing operational intelligence.328 Framing mutual sets of interests with related 
states can help significantly in establishing these partnerships, inasmuch as 
stakeholders should be convinced that they will benefit more from cooperation, 
as opposed to turning a blind eye to the PKK’s funding and terrorist activities. 
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3. Enhance the Capabilities of the Partner States 
Turkey should work to enhance the capabilities of countries in which the 
PKK operates. Through existing international partnerships or mutual agreements, 
Turkey should invest in enhancing the security, law enforcement, and intelligence 
capabilities of related countries. 
The PKK utilizes the geographical position of Turkey as a bridge between 
the Middle East and Europe for its activities, ranging from drug trafficking to THB. 
On one hand, Turkey should increase its law enforcement efforts to prevent the 
PKK’s criminal and terrorist activities within its borders, while, on the other, it 
should help its neighbors develop their law enforcement and economical 
mechanisms to intercept the PKK’s terrorist, criminal. and financial activities 
within their borders. 
Turkey’s economy is not strong enough to provide significant monetary aid 
to other countries over the long term. Thus, rather than making marginal 
economic aid efforts, it should engage in relatively low-cost efforts, such as 
workshops on countering PKK activities, personnel exchanges between 
agencies, experience-sharing conferences, and joint training sessions on law 
enforcement issues related to CTF and terrorist activities of the PKK. 
Disseminating knowledge about the PKK’s operating characteristics also helps 
law enforcement agencies to establish better counter strategies to cope with 
crimes such as extortion and illegal activities. These efforts offer long-term 
solutions. However, they also significantly help in increasing the related 
countries’ awareness of the PKK’s overall activities and in forming a strong 
international alliance against the PKK’s financial and terrorist activities. 
4. Identify an Interlocutor to the Kurdish Issue 
As discussed several times in the study, the PKK wants to equate its 
cause with the Kurdish issue, and at every chance declares itself as the sole 
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spokesperson on the Kurdish cause.329 Identifying and supporting a moderate 
interlocutor for the Kurdish issue will create a rival that can compete with the PKK 
for its existing power base. 
Barkan and Haines examine the radical flank effect in the social 
movements.330 Their findings argue that moderate social movement 
organizations benefit from the presence of extremist movement groups, because 
extremist movement groups change the perception of the movement in the eyes 
of authority, and make the cause of the moderate groups seem more tolerable, 
providing them a stronger bargaining position.331 With regard to the Kurdish 
issue, however, identifying a moderate interlocutor should cause a reverse 
radical flank effect and siphon power from the PKK’s support base. 
Moreover, such a proposed moderate actor would very likely cause 
fractioning within the PKK. In the beginning of the resurgence in 2004, Osman 
Ocalan, Abdullah Ocalan’s younger brother, and a group of leading figures 
including field commanders opposed the resumption of armed violence. This 
group cut its ties with the PKK and formed the Patriotic Democratic Party (Partiya 
Welatpareze Demokraten, or PWD) and started advocating the Turkish Kurds’ 
cultural rights by nonviolent means.332 Ultimately, the PWD initiative diminished, 
in great part because of the PKK’s assassination of its members, and in part 
because of the pressure from the Turkish government. Nonetheless, this 
example demonstrates that the PKK is subject to fractioning because of 
alternative moderate initiatives, and could lose a significant portion of its power 
base because of the emergence of other players on this issue. A new alternative 
entity would also cause fragmentation and obtain a notable portion of the PKK’s 
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diaspora support in Western Europe, giving moderates within the Kurdish 
community an option other than the PKK’s violent agenda. 
In sum, identifying and supporting a moderate interlocutor on the Kurdish 
issue is very likely to diminish the PKK’s power base within the Kurdish diaspora 
by offering them a nonviolent option. This, in turn, can reduce the amount of 
revenue collected and recruits drawn from the Kurdish diaspora, both in domestic 
and international scales. A possible second order effect of this policy is that it 
could promote fractioning within the PKK, thus undermining its unity and further 
diminishing its power. 
5. Increase the Credibility and the Legitimacy of the Government 
However minimal its presence, the PKK can still muster material and 
political support from Turkish Kurds living in the southeastern region of Turkey. 
Past counterterrorism policies and applications have alienated a portion of the 
population in this region. Thus, Turkey should increase the credibility and 
legitimacy of the government, especially in these regions, in order to deny the 
PKK public support. Furthermore, the PKK’s geographical safe haven in Iraq is 
an ungoverned territory for the GOI. Thus, encouraging measures and 
cooperating with the GOI to strengthen GOI’s authority in this region will increase 
the governability of the area, and will ultimately eradicate the PKK’s camps in the 
KRG region. Turkey can increase the capabilities of the GOI so as to counter the 
PKK’s activities through other policy options mentioned here. Nonetheless, 
increasing the governability of an area cannot be achieved through these 
policies. Furthermore, increasing the overall credibility and legitimacy of the 
government ensures that the safe havens will be eradicated permanently rather 
than emerging in other areas of the region. 
As discussed earlier, one of the characteristics of safe havens is their 
physical and political inaccessibility. Turkey should invest in the infrastructure of 
the southeastern regions of the country. Roads can improve the mobility of law 
enforcement forces and increase security in the area. Moreover, improved 
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mobility can help local markets so that legal merchandise can be brought to 
markets more cheaply and thus compete with smuggled goods. Utilities and 
other basic public services, such as hospitals and public education, should be 
extended to the most remote corners of the region. Public goods should be 
delivered uniformly and reliably in order to help reduce the appeal of PKK 
propaganda. For instance, the slowness of jurisdiction in the region helps the 
PKK’s propaganda stating that “the citizens do not take their disputes to the 
Turkish government, we handle them.”333 The Turkish government should 
employ effective structural reforms to solve similar problems. Basic public 
services and the rule of law should be a standard, rather than a privilege, in the 
daily life of citizens. 
Border security is another area needing improvement. While improving its 
own surveillance and security measures, Turkey should come to a mutual border 
security agreement with the GOI to control and secure the Iraq-Turkey border in 
order to deny the infiltration of PKK militants and trafficking of illegal goods. 
Smuggling and border trade constitutes a major portion of the local 
economy on both sides of the border. Both Turkey and the GOI should enforce 
necessary regulations so as to decrease the black and gray economies in the 
region. Measures such as well-regulated free trade zones near the border areas, 
offering incentives to trading businesses and establishing more border crossings, 
thus increasing the volume of border trade, can boost the legal economy and 
deprive the PKK of its illegal resources in the region. Promoting the local 
economy will in turn expand job opportunities and increase the wealth of the 
region. Increased welfare will make the local population less susceptible to PKK’s 
false promises of wealth to recruit militants. 
The law enforcement capacity of Turkish agencies should be increased, 
destroying criminal networks. Petty criminals, drug dealers, and THB suspects 
should be captured and brought to trial in an efficient manner, so as to deter the 
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criminals’ ability to conduct illegal activities. On one hand, this capacity will 
decrease the PKK’s income generated from illegal activities; on the other, it will 
deter criminal groups from serving as contractors for the PKK’s illegal activities. 
Another effect of increased law enforcement capacity would be to promote the 
legal economy and increase government legitimacy. 
In sum, Turkey should take measures to increase the legitimacy and 
credibility of state authority by improving the infrastructure, such as roads, 
bridges, electricity, water, and irrigation, and basic public services, such as 
education, health services, law, and order in the region. Furthermore, Turkey 
should aim to improve the legal economy in the region, both by creating jobs and 
fighting gray and black markets. Establishing strict border security can further 
undermine the infiltration of PKK militants and the trafficking of illegal goods. 
Turkey should also increase its law enforcement and judiciary capacity so as to 
improve government’s legitimacy in the region. 
Cooperating with the GOI and KRG officially is a must to effectively 
destroy the PKK’s safe havens in the KRG region. Most of the mentioned 
applications should also be employed by the GOI to disseminate the authority of 
the GOI effectively into the remote regions of the KRG area. The GOI should 
make every effort to deny its territory to groups that perform terrorist activities in 
neighboring states. The ethnicity and nationality of these groups should not 
prevent the GOI from taking action against them. Some of the measures, such as 
effective border security and eradication of the PKK’s camps, can only be 
achieved through cooperation of the two states. Accordingly, Turkey and the GOI 
should actively cooperate to apply measures that will ultimately deny the PKK a 
geographical safe haven and fund-raising apparatus in the KRG region. Should 
Turkey choose to directly engage the PKK’s camps in the KRG region without the 
cooperation or consent of the GOI, the local populace and the GOI will not 
support Turkey’s actions and the PKK will gain more political power in the region. 
Even if it takes longer, cooperating with the GOI and KRG is the only feasible 
way to eradicate the PKK’s safe havens. 
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C. MERGING THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION 
The policy recommendations proposed in this section address the problem 
areas designated by the analyses in Chapter IV and Chapter V. Table 4 shows 
the problem area and solution matrix. 
 
Table 4.   Policy Recommendations and Problem Areas Addressed 
Table 4 reveals that recommended policy options generally address more 
than one problem area. While it is logical to assert that some options have a 
greater impact on the PKK’s resources and physical structure, it would be equally 
unwise to single out these options and apply them separately. The overlapping 
options usually address different dimensions of a problem area, and should be 
applied simultaneously in order to generate a more effective impact on the PKK. 
Another point is that the effectiveness of policy options relies heavily on 
international actors. This situation should not be interpreted as the subjectivity of 
the study, because the majority of the funding apparatus and physical structure 
of the PKK is located outside the borders of Turkey. Consequently, 
countermeasures generally require action or cooperation from international 
actors. Even though Turkey has made a lot of progress in countering the PKK, 
especially after the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, a vast array of problem areas 
remain to be addressed regarding this issue domestically. 
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A fundamental characteristic of counterterrorism strategies is that there is 
no silver bullet. Therefore, no single strategy can eradicate a terrorist 
organization completely. Nonetheless, decisive and proper application of this 
study’s policy recommendations should cause a significant amount of damage to 
the financial and organizational structure of the PKK, which, in turn, should 
provide further opportunities to ultimately demobilize the PKK terrorist 
organization. 
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